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Abstract
In this paper, we study the quantum learnability of constant-depth classical circuits under
the uniform distribution and in the distribution-independent framework of PAC learning. In
order to attain our results, we establish connections between quantum learning and quantum-
secure cryptosystems. We then achieve the following results.
1. Hardness of learning AC0 and TC0 under the uniform distribution. Our first result
concerns the concept class TC0 (resp. AC0), the class of constant-depth and polynomial-
sized circuits with unbounded fan-in majority gates (resp. AND,OR,NOT gates). We show
the following:
• if there exists no quantum (quasi-)polynomial-time algorithm to solve the Ring-
Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem, then there exists no (quasi-)polynomial-time
quantum learning algorithm for TC0; and
• if there exists no 2O(d
1/η )-time quantum algorithm to solve RLWEwith dimension d =
O(polylogn) (for every constant η > 2), then there exists no O(nlog
ν n)-time quantum
learning algorithm for poly(n)-sized AC0 circuits (for a constant ν > 0), matching the
classical upper bound of Linial et al. [LMN93]
where the learning algorithms are under the uniform distribution (even with access to
quantummembership queries). The main technique in these results uses an explicit fam-
ily of pseudo-random functions that are believed to be quantum-secure to construct con-
cept classes that are hard to learn quantumly under the uniform distribution.
2. Hardness of learning TC02 in the PAC setting. Our second result shows that if there
exists no quantum polynomial-time algorithm for the LWE problem, then there exists no
polynomial-time quantum-PAC learning algorithm for the class TC02, i.e., depth-2 TC
0 cir-
cuits. The main technique in this result is to establish a connection between the quantum
security of public-key cryptosystems and the learnability of a concept class that consists
of decryption functions of the cryptosystem.
Our results show that quantum resources do not give an exponential improvement to learn-
ing constant-depth polynomial-sized neural networks. This also gives a strong (conditional)
negative answer to one of the “Ten Semi-Grand Challenges for Quantum Computing Theory”
raised by Aaronson [Aar05].
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1 Introduction
Machine learning is a diverse field of research with many real-world applications and has received
tremendous attention in the past decade. From a theoretical perspective, since the seminal paper
of Valiant [Val84], there has been a lot of theoretical effort in considering different learningmodels
that formalize what we mean by learning and understanding which problems can (or cannot) be
efficiently learned within these models.
In recent years, due to the considerable development of quantum computation (both on the
theoretical and experimental fronts), there has been an increased focus on understanding the
tasks for which quantum computers can offer speedups. Machine learning tasks have emerged as
a candidate in this respect. To this end, results in quantum learning theory aim to identify learning
problems for which quantum computers provably provide a (significant) advantage.
More concretely, in learning theory, the goal is to devise a learning algorithm (or learner) for a
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set of functions which is called a concept class. The functions in the concept class C are referred to
as concepts. In this paper, we will consider (without loss of generality) concepts that are Boolean
functions c : {0,1}n → {0,1}. The learner is provided with examples of the form (x,c(x)), where c is
an unknown concept lying in C and x is picked uniformly at random from {0,1}n and the goal of
the learner is to learn c, i.e., it should output a hypothesis h that is close to c.1 We say that a learner
A learns C, if for every c ∈ C, A learns c. In learning theory, the intent is to devise efficient learning
algorithms for an interesting concept class C, i.e., the learner should use few examples and not too
much time in order to learn C.
In quantum learning theory, the goal is still to learn concept classes C, but now with the access
to quantum resources. Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99] introduced a quantum learningmodel wherein
the learner is a quantum algorithm and is provided with quantum examples of the form
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x,c(x)〉
for some concept c ∈ C. In order to see why quantum examples generalize classical examples,
observe that a quantum learner could choose to measure the quantum example in the computa-
tional basis, which results in a classical example (x,c(x)) for a uniformly random x ∈ {0,1}n. The
advantage of quantum learning usually comes from the fact that one can perform arbitrary uni-
tary operations on these quantum examples, enabling one to improve sample or time complexity
for learning the concept class C.
The first example of a quantum advantage for a learning problemwas showed by Bernstein and
Vazirani [BV97]. They showed how to learn the concept class of linear functions C = {c(x) =∑i sixi
mod 2 : s ∈ {0,1}n}with a constant number of quantum examples. Classically, in order to learn this
concept class efficiently, it is necessary and sufficient to obtain Θ˜(n) examples. With these many
examples a classical learner can use Gaussian elimination and learn the unknown target concept
in polynomial time.
Subsequently, Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99] showed that the class of Boolean functions that can
be represented as polynomial-sized DNF formulas can be learned in quantum polynomial time.2
A crucial ingredient for their quantum learning algorithmwas the ability to perform Fourier sam-
pling using quantum examples (which we discuss in Section 1.2). Classically, Verbeurgt [Ver90]
showed that DNFs can be learned in quasi-polynomial time using classical examples and this has
remained the state-of-the art for the last thirty years! This emphasizes the power of quantum
examples for learning. There have been many other instances (which we discuss in Section 1.2)
where quantum examples give an advantage for quantum learning algorithms. A natural follow-
up question to the quantum-efficient learnability of DNF formulas, i.e., depth -2 circuits, is:
Can the concept class of shallow, i.e., constant-depth, classical circuits be learned more
efficiently using quantum resources as compared to classical resources?
In particular, are there efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) quantum learning algorithms for all of
the Boolean functions that can be represented by AC0 circuits, i.e., constant-depth circuits with
unbounded fan-in AND,OR,NOT gates? More ambitiously, can we quantum-efficiently learn TC0,
i.e., constant-depth circuits with majority gates.3 This question was raised by Aaronson [Aar05]
as one of the “Ten Semi-Grand Challenges for Quantum Computing Theory”.
1More formally, this is referred to as the uniform-distribution learning setting. In learning theory there are several
variations of this model that we skip for the sake of simplicity. See Section 1.1 for a brief introduction and Section 2.4
for more details.
2A DNF formula is a disjunction of conjunctions of variables and their negations.
3A majority gate on n bits outputs 1 if ⌊n/2⌋+1 bits evaluate to 1 and 0 otherwise.
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We notice that understanding the learnability of TC0, apart from being theoretically impor-
tant, also sheds light on the question: can quantum computers help learn the weights of neural
networks faster? It is well-known [MSS91, GHR92] that constant-depth polynomial-sized feed-
forward neural networks, where the weights of neurons are bounded by a polynomial in the input
size, can be implemented by TC0 circuits.
In this work we address this question and give evidence that efficient quantum algorithms do
not exist for learning TC0. More concretely, under the assumption that the Ring-Learning with Er-
rors problem (RLWE) [LPR13a] cannot be solved in (quasi-)polynomial time by quantum comput-
ers, the class of TC0 functions cannot be weak-learned in quantum (quasi-)polynomial time. Also,
under the less-standard assumption that RLWE cannot be solved in strongly sub-exponential time,
by quantum computers, we show that there exists a constant ν > 0 such that there is no nO(log
ν n)-
time quantum learning algorithm for AC0. Here, the “strongly sub-exponential” time hardness for
RLWE is defined as follows: for every constant η > 2, the d-dimensional RLWE problem cannot be
solved in 2O(d
1/η )-time by quantum computers. RLWE is one of the leading candidates for efficient
post-quantum cryptography and it is believed to be hard to solve, even for quantum computers.
For instance, the current best-known quantum algorithms for it [Sta19] do not, asymptotically,
perform any better than the lattice reduction techniques used for the Learning with Errors prob-
lem [CN11, LLL82].
1.1 Learning models
In this section, we first recall the definitions of the classical and quantum learning models. For a
detailed introduction to these models, we refer the reader to Section 2.4.
Classical learningmodel. In the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of learning pro-
posed by Valiant [Val84], a concept class C is a subset of Boolean functions, i.e., C ⊆ {c : {0,1}n →
{0,1}} and every element c : {0,1}n → {0,1} in C is referred to as a concept . The goal of the
learning algorithm A is to learn an unknown target concept c ∈ C given labeled examples of the
form (x,c(x)) where x is drawn from an unknown distribution D : {0,1}n → [0,1]. We say that a
learning algorithm A learns C if it satisfies the following: for every c ∈ C and every distribution
D : {0,1}n → [0,1], with probability at least 2/3, A outputs a hypothesis h : {0,1}n → {0,1} that
satisfies Prx∼D[h(x) = c(x)] ≥ 1− ε. The advantage of the learner over a random guess is β := 12 − ε2
and β is called the bias of the learner. The learnerA properly learns the concept class C if its output
hypothesis is always in the concept class, i.e., h ∈ C. Otherwise, A is an improper learner for C.
Similarly,A is a weak learner if β = n−c for some constant c > 0 and A is a strong learner if β ≥ 1/6.
In this paper all our lower bounds will be for improper learners and, unless explicitly stated, for
weak learners.
The sample complexity of a learning algorithmA is the worst-case number of labeled examples
it uses and the time complexity ofA is the worst-case running time (where the worst-case is taken
with respect to the hardest concept c ∈ C and distribution D). The sample/time complexity of a
concept class C is the sample/time complexity of the most efficient learning algorithm for C.
In this work, we also consider learning models that relax the PAC learning framework in two
ways. First we allow the learner to makemembership queries to a target concept c, i.e.,A is allowed
to ask “what is c(x)” for an arbitrary x of its choice. Second, instead of the learner succeeding
under every distribution D, we consider the learnability of C when D is fixed and known to the
learner. We say that A PAC-learns C under D with membership queries if: for every c ∈ C, with
probability ≥ 2/3, A, takes labeled examples and makes membership queries, and outputs a hy-
pothesis h such that Prx∼D[h(x) , c(x)] ≤ ε.
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Quantum learning model. Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99] introduced the model of quantum-PAC
learning, which naturally generalizes the classical PAC model. Here, a quantum learning algo-
rithm A has to learn the unknown concept c ∈ C given quantum examples of the form∑
x
√
D(x)|x,c(x)〉,
where D : {0,1}n → [0,1] is an unknown distribution. The goal of the quantum learner and the
notion of sample and time complexities are analogous to the classical model.
As described in the classical setting, we also consider the model where the quantum learning
algorithm is given access to an oracle Oc : |x,b〉 → |x,b⊕ c(x)〉 that allows it to make quantum mem-
bership queries. Additionally, instead of requiring the learner to succeed for all distributions D,
we also consider quantum learners that learn C under a fixed distribution D. For quantum learn-
ing algorithms, a natural choice of D is the uniform distribution over {0,1}n, and in this case
a quantum example is given by 1√
2n
∑
x |x,c(x)〉. We discuss the utility of such examples in the
next section. We say a learner A uniform quantum-PAC learns C with membership queries if: for
every c ∈ C, with probability ≥ 2/3,A uses uniform quantum examples and quantummembership
queries to output a hypothesis h such that Prx∼D[h(x) , c(x)] ≤ ε.
1.2 Strengths of quantum examples under the uniform distribution
One of the main tools in quantum learning theory, when considering learning under the uniform
distribution, is the ability to efficiently perform Fourier sampling. In order to explain it, we first
introduce the following. For a Boolean function c : {0,1}n → {−1,1}, the Fourier coefficients of c
are given by ĉ(S) = 12n
∑
S c(x)(−1)x·S . The Fourier distribution {̂c(S)2 : S ∈ {0,1}n} is given by the
squared Fourier coefficients of c and they satisfy
∑
S ĉ(S)
2 = 1. Fourier sampling refers to the task
of sampling from the Fourier distribution {̂c(S)2}S .
An advantage of having uniform quantum examples is that, using standard ideas from quan-
tum information theory, a quantum learner can efficiently perform the operation
1√
2n
∑
x
|x,c(x)〉 →
∑
S
ĉ(S)|S〉
given O(1) copies of 1√
2n
∑
x |x,c(x)〉. Measuring the resulting state allows a quantum learner to
obtain a sample from the Fourier distribution. Hence, using uniform quantum examples, one
can sample from the Fourier distribution {̂c(S)2}S . Classically, we do not know how to perform
this sampling process (or even approximately sample) efficiently, since the Fourier coefficients
ĉ(S) depends on 2n values of x. Therefore, one avenue to obtain quantum speedups with uniform
quantum examples arises from the use of Fourier sampling.
Indeed, quantum Fourier sampling has been profitably used in many applications. This idea
was first used in the aforementioned paper of Bernstein and Vazirani [BV97], where they observe
that the Fourier support of linear functions is concentrated on a single point. Therefore, unknown
linear functions can be learned using just one uniform quantum example. Fourier sampling was
later used by Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99] to show that DNFs can be learned quantum-efficiently.
A classical analogue of this question is a long-standing open question.4 Kanade et al. [KRS18]
extended the result of Bshouty and Jackson and showed how to learn DNFs quantum-efficiently
even under product distributions.
In fact, a notorious bottleneck in classical learning theory is obtaining a polynomial time
4With classical membership queries, DNF formulas can be learned in classical polynomial time [Jac97].
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learning algorithm for the class of O(logn)-juntas5 which are a subset of polynomial-sized DNFs.
By contrast, Atıcı and Servedio [AS09] showed that O(logn)-juntas can be learned quantum-
efficiently under the uniform distribution. In fact the time-efficient learnability of O(logn)-juntas
can be used to time-efficiently quantum learn the concept class NC0 under the uniform distribu-
tion (for a proof of this, see Appendix A).6 Subsequently, Arunachalam et al. [ACL+19] showed
that the concept class of k-Fourier-sparse Boolean functions (which includes both (logk)-juntas
and linear functions) can be learned query-efficiently given quantum examples.
One thing common to all these results was the application of the Fourier sampling to learn a
concept class under the uniform distribution, which was key for the large quantum speedup.
Related work. In the context of learning, apart from the uniform distribution setting, some
works have focused on understanding the power of quantum learning under arbitrary distribu-
tions [SG04, AS05, AW18]. In particular, [AW18] showed that quantum examples do not provide
an advantage over classical examples for PAC learning.
Recently, both shallow circuits and the Learning with Errors problem have been used in dif-
ferent contexts to understand the capabilities of quantum computation. Grilo et al. [GKZ19]
showed that polynomially many quantum examples suffice to solve the LWE problem in quantum
polynomial time, while this remains a hard problem when given just classical examples. Bravyi et
al. [BGK18] exhibited a problem which can be solved using shallow quantum circuits but requires
logarithmic depth classical circuits (with bounded fan-in) to solve. BeneWatts et al. [BKST19] im-
proved their result by removing the “bounded fan-in” assumption. In another context, under the
assumption that the Learning with Errors problem is hard for quantum computers (given just
classical examples), Mahadev [Mah18] demonstrated a classical protocol to classically verify the
result of an efficient quantum computation.
1.3 Our results
In this paper we address two natural questions that arise from the work of Bshouty and Jack-
son [BJ99], which showed the quantum-efficient learnability of depth-2 circuits.
The first question is, can the work of [BJ99] be extended to learn depth-3 circuits, or more gen-
erally, constant-depth polynomial-sized circuits (i.e., TC0 and AC0) in quantum polynomial time?
Classically, in a seminal result, Linial, Mansour and Nisan [LMN93] constructed an nO(polylogn)-
time learning algorithm for AC0 by approximately learning the Fourier spectrum of an unknown
AC0 circuit. Subsequently, Kharitonov [Kha93] showed that their learning algorithm is optimal as-
suming that factoring cannot be solved in quasi-polynomial time. Since factoring can be solved in
quantum polynomial time with Shor’s algorithm [Sho97], the lower bound of Kharitonov doesn’t
apply to quantum learners. Moreover, since Fourier sampling is easy quantumly (under the uni-
form distribution), it seems plausible that one could efficiently learn important properties of the
Fourier spectrum of AC0 circuits (similar to the work of Linial et al. [LMN93]). This could possibly
result in efficient quantum learning algorithms for AC0 under the uniform distribution (similar to
many results discussed in the previous section).
The second question is, can the work of [BJ99] be extended to the class of depth-2 threshold
circuits (known as TC02), i.e., can TC
0
2 be learned quantum-efficiently? We notice that TC
0 circuits
are practically very relevant since constant-depth polynomial-sized feed-forward neural networks
with weights (of the neurons) bounded by some polynomial in the input size, can be implemented
5A k-junta is a Boolean function on n bits, whose output only depends on k out of the n input bits.
6NC0 is the concept class of constant-depth circuits consisting of fan-in 2 AND,OR,NOT gates.
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as circuits in TC0 [MSS91, GHR92]. If there were efficient quantum algorithms for learning TC0,
then it is plausible that quantum computers could give an enormous advantage in approximately
learning the weights for neural networks.
In this paper, we give a conditional negative answer to both questions. In particular, we show
that under the assumptions that support the security of current post-quantum cryptography: TC0
and AC0 cannot be learned efficiently by quantum computers under the uniform distribution (un-
der different assumptions); and TC02 cannot be PAC learned efficiently by quantum computers. We
summarize these results in the table below.7
These results give a strong negative answer to a question of Aaronson [Aar05], under crypto-
No learner in this model Running in complexity class
For the
Assuming
(with membership queries)
PAC
Uniform-distribution
constant ν > 0
nO(log
ν n) time for a
AC0 algorithm for RLWE
No strongly sub-exponential time
2O(polylogn) time TC0 algorithm for RLWE
No quasi-polynomial time
poly(n) time TC0 RLWE < BQP
Distribution-free PAC poly(n) time TC02 LWE < BQP
Table 1: Hardness of learning results for poly(n)-sized circuits.
graphic assumptions. Aaronson asked if, TC0 and AC0 can be quantum-PAC learned in polynomial
time. Our first result already gives a (conditional) negative answer even when we fix the uniform
distribution and allow the learner to make quantummembership queries. Our second result gives
a conditional refutation to the PAC learnability of TC0 even when restricted to depth-2 thresh-
old circuits.
In order to achieve our results, we follow a strategy proposed by Valiant [Val84], who showed
the hardness of proper learning the class of polynomial-sized circuits based on the security of cryp-
tographic objects. This strategy was subsequently improved upon to give conditional improper
learning lower bounds and used to prove the classical hardness of various concept classes [Kha92,
Kha93, KV94, KS09]. These results have the following structure: assuming there exists an effi-
cient learning algorithm for some concept class C, there exists an adversary that is able to break
some cryptographic construction using the learning algorithm as a subroutine. Here, the adver-
sary provides the resources to the learning algorithm based on the cryptographic primitive it is
trying to break. This implies that if the cryptographic construction is secure, then such a learning
algorithm cannot exist.
In this paper, we quantize these well-studied classical proof-of-hardness techniques. The dif-
ficulties in quantizing such results are three-fold. First, many of the classical hardness of learning
results rely on cryptographic primitives whose security is based on the hardness of factoring. As
stated previously, this would not hold in the quantum regime due to Shor’s quantum polynomial-
time factoring algorithm [Sho97]. Second, the fact that adversaries can efficiently create classical
examples from some distribution D does not imply that quantum examples can be created accord-
ing to the same distribution. An important issue we run into in this case is solving the index-
erasure problem, which is known to be hard to solve on quantum computers [AMRR11, LR19].
Finally, some of the hardness results implicitly use the fact that the learning algorithm they are
considering is classical and the proof techniques do not follow through in the quantum setting.
7BQP, or bounded-error quantum polynomial time, is the class of decision-problems that be solved in polynomial time
on a quantum computer with bounded-error.
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For example, Kharitonov [Kha93] uses collision arguments to bound the amount of information
retrieved by the learner, but this approach does not work quantumly. We discuss these issues in
further detail in the next section.
In subsequent sections, we delineate the connections between the hardness of quantum learn-
ing and the security of certain cryptographic primitives – specifically, quantum-secure family of
pseudo-random functions and public-key encryption schemes. Next, we sketch how to use these
connections to show hardness of quantum learning for some interesting concept classes.
1.3.1 Pseudo-random functions vs. quantum learning
A family of pseudo-random functions (PRF) are cryptographic objects that “mimic” random func-
tions. More concretely, a PRF is a keyed-family of functions F = {fk : {0,1}n → {0,1}ℓ where k ∈
{0,1}M } such that no efficient adversary that is given query access to f can distinguish if f was uni-
formly picked from F or a truly random function with non-negligible advantage over a random
guess.8 If even polynomial time quantum adversaries cannot distinguish such cases with quantum
query access to the function, then we say that the PRF is quantum-secure. We informally state our
first result below (see Corollary 4.3 for a full statement).
Result 1 If there is a quantum-secure PRF F , then F does not have an efficient uniform quantum-PAC
learner with membership queries.
Kharitonov [Kha93] established the connection between Pseudo-random generators (PRGs)
and classical learning by constructing a circuit class such that the PRG is computed by the circuit
class. He proceeded to show that if a learning algorithm for such a concept class existed, then
would be possible to break the PRG. This approach (implicitly) requires that while the complexity
of the PRG scales polynomially with the size of the seed, it achieves a super-polynomial stretch
Such a requirement is satisfied, for instance, by the BBS PRG [BBS86], whose security relies on
hardness of factoring.
Unfortunately, no post-quantum PRGs are known with this property. Inspired by the ideas
used in [Kha93], we overcome this by considering the connection between quantum-secure PRFs
and we prove Result 1. We stress that the proof in [Kha93] does not trivially quantize. For in-
stance, the crux in Kharitonov’s proof is determining the probability of collision in the classical
examples, and this does not make sense in the quantum regime. Clearly, each quantum exam-
ple contains information about every input. However, we can show that efficiently accessing this
information simultaneously for most x is information-theoretically impossible.
We now sketch a proof of Result 1. Let F = {fk : {0,1}n → {0,1} where k ∈ {0,1}M }. By con-
tradiction, let us assume there exists an efficient uniform-PAC quantum learning algorithm for
F . Using this efficient learner, we show how to construct a quantum distinguisher for the PRF
F . As F is assumed to be quantum-secure, we obtain a contradiction and prove the result. More
concretely, let f be a a function and suppose a distinguisher with access to f has to determine if it
comes from F or it is a truly random function. Consider a distinguisher that simulates a quantum
learning algorithm A by using his oracle to answer the learner’s queries. A is supposed to output
a hypothesis h that approximates f . The distinguisher then picks a random challenge x∗ ∈ {0,1}n
and outputs 1 if and only if h(x∗) = f (x∗). One technical aspect that we show here is that, if the
learning algorithm has bias β(n), then the distinguisher has an advantage ≥ β(n)2 in distinguishing
if f comes from the pseudo-random function family or is a random function. In particular, if
8By negligible advantage, we mean: for every c > 0 the advantage is at most 1/nc.
7
there is a polynomial time weak quantum learning algorithm for F under the uniform distribu-
tion, then there exists a polynomial-time quantum distinguisher D and some constant c > 0 that
satisfies ∣∣∣∣ Pr
f ∈F
[D|f 〉(·)]− Pr
f ∈U
[D|f 〉(·)]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1
nc
, (1)
where, in the first case, f is picked uniformly at random fromF and, in the second case, f is a uni-
formly random function. The key point in order to prove that a quantum learner with advantage
β(n) implies a distinguisher with advantage
β(n)
2 is to bound the success probability of learning a
random function.
1.3.2 Public-key encryption schemes vs. quantum learning
A public-key encryption scheme consists of a triple of algorithms (Key-generator, Enc, Dec). Key-
generator is a randomized algorithm that on input 1n (where n is a security parameter) outputs
a tuple (Kpub,Kpriv), where Kpub is a publicly known key used to encrypt messages and Kpriv is a
private key used to decrypt messages. Enc is a deterministic algorithm that receives as input the
public key Kpub, some randomness r and a message b ∈ {0,1} and outputs Enc(Kpub, r,b), which we
denote by EncKpub(r,b) for simplicity. Dec receives as input the private key Kpriv and EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
and outputs c ∈ {0,1} (we write DecKpriv in order be explicit about the dependence of Dec on Kpriv).
The public-key encryption scheme is said to be correct if: for uniformly random values r∗ and b∗
DecKpriv
(
EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
)
, b∗ with negligible probability. An encryption scheme is (quantum) se-
cure if, given Kpub and EncKpub(r
∗,b∗), a (quantum) polynomial time adversary can output b∗ with
at most a negligible advantage over a random guess.
We connect quantum-secure public-key encryption schemes to the hardness of learning as
follows (see Theorem 5.1 for a full statement).
Result 2 Let S be a quantum-secure public-key cryptosystem. If CS is the concept class containing the
decryption functions of the cryptosystem S, then there is no efficient weak quantum-PAC learner for CS.
The works of Kearns and Valiant [KV94] and Klivans and Sherstov [KS09] provide a connection
between public-key encryption schemes and learning functions. They showed that if there exists
a PAC learning algorithm for a concept class that contains the decryption function DecKpriv , then
it is possible to predict b∗ from Kpub and EncKpub(r
∗,b∗) with a 1/ poly(n) bias. They prove this
by simulating the learning algorithm as follows: the distinguisher prepares examples of the form
(r,EncKpub(r,b)) for (uniformly) random r and b. Using the guarantees of the classical PAC learning
algorithm and the correctness of the encryption scheme, they show that the hypothesis h output
by the learner satisfies
Pr
r∗,b∗
[
h
(
EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
)
= b∗
]
≥ 1
2
+
1
nc
,
for some c > 0. In this paper, we quantize their argument, but the situation is much more intricate
than in the classical case. Classically, r and b can be picked uniformly at random at each step in
order to create a new training example (EncKpub(r,b),b). Quantumly, however, we do not know
of an efficient way to create a quantum example 1√
2|R|
∑
r,b |EncKpub(r,b)〉|b〉, where R is the space
of the possible randomness. Notice that a straightforward way of preparing this state involves
solving the index-erasure problem [AMRR11, LR19], which is conjectured to be a hard problem
to solve on a quantum computer. See Section 5 for more details.
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Instead, we first define a distributionD as follows: pick poly(n)-many uniformly random (r,b)
and let D be the uniform distribution over {EncKpub(r,b)} where the set ranges over the poly(n)-
many observed (r,b). Our hope is to run the quantum learner on this distribution D (which we
are allowed to since we assumed that it is a quantum-PAC learner). However, we run into an
issue which [KS09] need not worry about. Let EncKpub(r
∗,b∗) be the challenge string that the dis-
tinguisher needs to correctly decrypt to b∗. Observe that EncKpub(r
∗,b∗) need not even lie in the
support of D, so running a quantum learner on the distributionD might not even help the distin-
guisher in predicting b∗. In contrast, in the simulation argument of Klivans and Sherstov [KS09]
the pair (EncKpub(r
∗,b∗),b∗) is always in the support of the distribution, since r and b are picked
uniformly at random to create the classical example (EncKpub(r,b),b).
Ideally, we would like to use our PAC learner on a distributionD′ for which (EncKpub(r
∗,b∗),b∗)
is the support of D′. This would enable the distinguisher to use the guarantees of a quantum
learner when run on D′. The challenge here is that the distinguisher would need to find such a D′
without prior knowledge of EncKpub(r
∗,b∗) and b∗! We circumvent this issue with the following ob-
servation: if two distributions are sufficiently close to each other, then the learner should perform
“essentially equivalently” on both distributions. In particular, we use a training distribution D
that is close enough to the testing distributionD′ containing (EncKpub(r
∗,b∗),b∗) so that the learning
algorithm is unable to distinguish them.
We now provide more details here. Suppose we have a quantum-secure public-key cryptosys-
tem with a (randomized) encryption function EncKpub,r : {0,1} → {0,1}n and decryption function
DecKpriv : E → {0,1}n, where E is the set of all valid encryptions and (Kpub,Kpriv) is the output of
the Key-generation algorithm. Assume that the challenge string is EncKpub(r
∗,b∗) for a uniformly
random r∗,b∗ and an adversary for this cryptosystem has to correctly guess b∗.
In order to construct such an adversary, first define the concept class C = {DecKpriv : Kpriv}, the
set of all decryption functions (one for each private key). Furthermore, assume that there is a
weak quantum-PAC learner for C that uses L examples, i.e., a polynomial-time quantum learning
algorithm A which receives L quantum examples ∑x√D(x)|x,c(x)〉 (for an unknown distribution
D and concept c ∈ C) and outputs a hypothesis h that is close to the concept c.
As discussed previously, we now define a meaningful distribution D on which the distin-
guisher runs the quantum learner: consider a set S with L3 tuples (ri ,bi ) that are chosen uniformly
at random from their respective domains; let D be the uniform distribution over {EncKpub(r,b) :
(r,b) ∈ S}. The adversary behaves as follows: run the quantum-PAC learner A under the distribu-
tion D and provide it L quantum examples of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
L3
∑
(r,b)∈S
|EncKpub(r,b)〉|b〉.
When A outputs the hypothesis h, the adversary outputs h
(
EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
)
as its guess for b∗. No-
tice that with overwhelming probability, S does not contain the tuple (r∗,b∗) corresponding to the
challenge. So there should be no guarantee on the value of h
(
EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
)
. In order to overcome
this, consider a quantum example state
|ψ′〉 = 1√
L3 +1
|EncKpub(r∗,b∗)〉|b∗〉+ ∑
(r,b)∈S
|EncKpub(r,b)〉|b〉
 .
We show that as the learner uses only L quantum examples, |ψ〉⊗L, the output statistics of every
quantum learning algorithm, when run on |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉, is very similar. In fact, we show that the
distribution on the hypothesis set is almost the same in each case. Now, using the performance
guarantees of a quantum-PAC learning algorithm and the closeness of the distributions between
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the hypothesis sets, we conclude that h
(
EncKpub(r
∗,b∗)
)
equals b∗ with probability at least 12+
1
poly(n)
.
This contradicts the quantum-secure assumption on the cryptosystem.
1.3.3 Conditional hardness of learning TC0 and AC0
Hardness of TC0. The first consequence of Result 1 is to give a strong negative answer to the ques-
tion of Aaronson [Aar05] regarding the quantum learnability of TC0 circuits, under cryptographic
assumptions.
Result 3 If the Ring-Learning with Errors problem cannot be solved in quantum polynomial time, then
there is no polynomial-time uniform weak quantum-PAC learner for TC0 with membership queries.
As previously mentioned, the Ring-Learning with Errors problem – i.e., the Learning with Er-
rors problem defined over polynomial rings instead of matrices – is a cornerstone of state of the
art efficient post-quantum cryptosystems and is widely believed to be hard for quantum comput-
ers. The starting point for proving Result 3 is a ring variant of the pseudo-random function family
presented by Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [BPR12], which was proven to be quantum secure by
Zhandry [Zha12]. We show that our variant of the PRF is quantum secure under the assumption
that the Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem cannot be solved by quantum computers effi-
ciently. We do not define the RLWE problem here (see Section 3.2 for details), but point out that
RLWE is believed to be as hard as LWE. Our variant of the PRF, denoted RF , satisfies two crucial
properties: (a) every f ∈ RF can be computed by a TC0 circuit; and (b) suppose there exists a
distinguisher D for RF – i.e., there exists some constant c > 0 and a polynomial-time algorithm D
that satisfies ∣∣∣∣ Pr
f ∈RF
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]− Pr
f ∈U
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1
nc
(2)
where f ∈ U denotes a uniformly random function – then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that solves RLWE. We can then use our connection between PRFs and the hardness of quantum
learning (Result 1) to prove Result 3.
We remark that this work contains the first explicit proof that such a PRF can indeed be im-
plemented in TC0. Building on results laid out in [LPR13b, HAB02] for ring arithmetic, this is
shown by carefully considering the cost of efficiently representing ring elements and performing
operations such as iterated multiplication over these ring elements. Also, note that it is crucial to
consider the RLWE version of the PRF instead of the standard LWE version as the matrix arithmetic
operations needed to implement the latter would require log-depth circuits.
Given the translation between feed-forward neural networks and TC0 circuits [MSS91], our
negative result on learning TC0 implies that, quantum resources do not give an exponential ad-
vantage in learning the weights of such neural networks (assuming LWE is quantum-hard).
We now make an alternate choice of parameters for the PRF RF in order to prove a stronger
hardness result on quantum learning TC0. However, a caveat of using alternate parameters is, we
need to make stronger assumptions on the hardness of the RLWE problem.
Result 4 If the Ring-Learning with Errors problem cannot be solved in quantum quasi-polynomial
time, then there is no quasi-polynomial time uniform weak quantum-PAC learner for TC0 with mem-
bership queries.
As far as we are aware, the above result wasn’t known even in the classical literature (the
only result in this flavor was proven by Fortnow and Klivans [FK09] who proved the hardness
of learning based on circuit complexity theoretic assumptions). Kharitonov’s proof with the BBS
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PRG [BBS86] cannot yield the above result. In fact, allowing a quasi-polynomial time learner for
the BBS PRG, using Kharitonov’s proof, will result in a weak-distinguisher, i.e., an algorithm that
can distinguish between a random function and a PRF with 2−polylogn probability. By contrast,
our Result 1 allows us to improve upon Kharitonov’s result by showing that a quasi-polynomial
time learner yields a distinguisher with 1/ poly(n) probability of distinguishing between a random
function and a function from RF .
Hardness of AC0. Here we show how to choose a new set of parameters for the PRF RF that
allows it to be implemented in AC0. Unfortunately, this comes with the added costs of requiring
stronger assumptions on the hardness of RLWE and weakening the achieved conclusion, namely
our hardness result holds for strong learners (i.e., learners with bias β ≥ 1/6). We achieve the
following result.
Result 5 If there is no strongly sub-exponential time quantum algorithm for the Ring-Learning with
Errors problem, then there is no nO(log
ν n)-time uniform strong quantum-PAC learner for AC0 circuits
on n bits (for a constant ν > 0), using membership queries, where d =O(polylogn).
In order to better understand this assumption, we remark that the current best known classical
algorithms for LWE require exponential time [LLL82, CN11] and any straightforward quantization
of these results gives only a polynomial speedup. These algorithms are currently believed to be
the best known algorithms for RLWE as well. More specifically, for d-dimensional RLWE instances
of interest in Section 4.2, these algorithms would scale as 2O(
√
d)-time. Therefore, any non-trivial
improvements in the exponent for these RLWE algorithms would also be a breakthrough for the
algorithms and cryptanalysis communities.
There is a key difference involved in proving Result 5, as compared to Result 3. An inherent
problem in directly using the RLWR-based PRFRF to prove Result 5 is that, any circuit computing
a function f ∈ RF needs to compute an iterated multiplication of many ring elements. While this
can be done efficiently with a TC0 circuit, it cannot be computed using an AC0 circuit. In fact, it is
a priori unclear if we can devise PRFs with super-polynomially large truth tables whose hardness
is based on a quantum-hard problem while also being computable in AC0.9
In order to overcome this issue, we use a technique that was also used by Kharitonov [Kha93];
by considering PRFs with a truth-table size that is sub-exponential in the dimension of the under-
lying RLWR problem. Specifically, we obtain a PRF RF ′ whose truth-table size is polynomial in n
while the dimension, d, is poly-logarithmic in n. We show that computing an arbitrary function
f ∈ RF ′ can be performed by an AC0 circuit. However, this increase in truth table size – from
being super-polynomial in d as in the TC0 case to being sub-exponential in d for AC0 – which
means that a stronger hardness assumption is needed to guarantee the security of this PRF. To this
end, by assuming that d-dimensional RLWE cannot be solved by quantum computers in strongly
sub-exponential time (i.e., 2O(d
1/η )-time for every constant η > 2), the PRF that we consider here
is quantum-secure. With this new PRF such that d = O(polylogn), we repeat the arguments of
Result 3 and show the nO(log
ν n)-time hardness of quantum learning for AC0 for a constant ν > 0
that depends on η.
We remark that Result 5 matches the upper bound of Linial, Mansour and Nisan [LMN93] (up
to the constant ν in the exponent), who showed how to classically learn AC0 circuits on n bits using
nO(polylog(n)) many random examples (x,c(x)) where x is drawn from the uniform distribution. Our
9Here we mean that the size of the truth table for each function in the PRF is super-polynomial in the dimension of
the underlying quantum problem.
11
result shows that, up to the ν in the exponent, the classical learning algorithm of [LMN93] is
optimal even if one is given access to uniform quantum examples and is allowed to make quantum
queries, under the RLWE assumption explained previously.
It is worth noting that our result also implies conditional hardness results for classical learning
of TC0 and AC0, under the assumption that solving RLWE is hard for classical computers (instead
of factoring in the case of Kharitonov [Kha93]).
1.3.4 Conditional hardness of PAC learning TC02
Our third hardness result is the following.
Result 6 If the Learning with Errors problem cannot be solved in quantum polynomial time, then there
is no polynomial-time weak quantum-PAC learner for TC02.
In contrast to our first hardness result for TC0, we stress that the quantum learners in this result
are quantum-PAC learners. The main idea to prove this result is to consider the LWE-based public-
key cryptosystem proposed by Regev [Reg09] (see Section 3.1.2). Klivans and Sherstov [KS09]
considered this cryptosystem and showed that the decryption functions in this cryptosystem can
be implemented by circuits in TC02. We can then use our connection between quantum learning
and quantum-secure cryptosystems (Result 2) to derive Result 6.
1.4 Open questions
This work raises a number of interesting open questions, which we list below.
Learning AC0d . What is the smallest d for which we can prove that quantum learning AC
0
d is
(conditionally) hard? Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99] gave a quantum polynomial-time algorithm for
AC02 and for some universal constant d
′ ≥ 3 (independent of the input-size of the AC0d ′ circuit),
our work rules out polynomial-time learning algorithms for AC0d ′ , assuming there exists no sub-
exponential time quantum algorithm for the RLWE problem. Classically, using the constant-depth
construction of PRGs by Naor and Reingold [NR04] in Kharitonov’s [Kha93] result, one can show
that AC05 is hard to learn (assuming factoring is hard on a classical computer).
Uniform learning of TC02. The conditional hardness results of TC
0 under the uniform distribu-
tion and hardness of quantum-PAC learning TC02 do not rule out the possibility that TC
0
2 admits
polynomial-time quantum learning algorithms under the uniform distribution. It is an open ques-
tion to show if TC02 can be learned quantum-efficiently under the uniform distribution or if we can
show a conditional hardness result.
Hardness of (quantum) learning quantum shallow circuits Linial et al. [LMN93] showed the
quasi-polynomial time learnability of shallow classical circuits. Correspondingly, what would
be the time/sample complexity of learning shallow quantum circuits with a quantum learner?
Recently Chung and Lin [CL18] showed that polynomially many samples suffice to learn the class
of polynomial-sized quantum circuits.
Hardness of quantum learning from other assumptions Finally, we leave as an open question
the possibility of proving the hardness of quantum learning from other complexity-theoretic as-
sumptions. We now point to some potential directions:
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• Recent results have proved Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH)-based hardness of
the Gap-SVP [AS18] problem and the Subset− sum [ABHS19] problem (actually, they prove
the limit of a specific approach to solve the Subset− sum problem). These hardness results
do not imply any hardness for learning problems directly and we wonder if they can be
tightened in order to make it possible.
• Oliveira and Santhanam [OS17] established a connection between learning theory, circuit
lower bounds and pseudo-randomness. Is it possible to quantize such connections?
• Daniely and Schwartz [DS16] showed a complexity-theoretic hardness of PAC learningDNFs.
Could we also show hardness for quantum-PAC learning DNFs as well?
1.5 Differences with previous version
This version of this work differs from the previous version, due to a mistake in the former proof.
We discuss the main change below.
In the previous version of this work, we claimed to prove hardness of learning TC0 and AC0
based on the quantum security of pseudorandom generators. In our proof, we assumed that the
run-time of a learning algorithm depended only on the input size. Essentially, we considered a
learning algorithm A that runs in time na with bias n−c for a concept class on n bits, and showed
the existence of a PRG G that takes an n-bit seed having a stretch nd where d > a+ c that A cannot
learn efficiently.
However, in the standard definition of polynomial-time learnability, the run-time of a quan-
tum learning algorithm should depend both on the input size n as well as the representation size of
the concept class. In other words, an efficient learner A for a PRG G, with an n-bit seed, stretch nd
and representation size ns, is allowed to take time O(poly(n,ns)). Under this definition, for every
instantiation of our PRG, since ns > nd , there exists an efficient learning algorithm with run-time
na > ns > nd , thereby not leading to any contradiction, or hardness-of-learning the concept class.
In order to achieve our hardness results in this updated version, we use pseudorandom functions
such that for every choice of parameters, their truth-table size T (n)≫ poly(n,s(n)), where s(n) is
the representation size of the function. Hence for every learning algorithmA running in time t(n),
we show the existence of a PRF with truth table size T (n)≫ O(poly(n,s(n)) ≥ t(n) that A cannot
learn efficiently.
Organization
In Section 2, we state some required lemmas, discuss cryptographic primitives and formally de-
fine the classical and quantum learning models. In Section 3, we discuss the (Ring)Learning with
Errors problem and its variants along with the pseudo-random functions constructed from these
problems. In Section 4, we describe the connection between quantum-secure PRFs and quan-
tum learning under the uniform distribution and prove our main results showing the hardness
of learning TC0 and AC0. Finally, in Section 5, we show the connection between quantum-secure
public-key cryptosystems and quantum-PAC learning and conclude with the proof for the hard-
ness of PAC-learning TC02.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and basic claims
We define some widely used definitions below. For the set of integers Z and an integer q, define
Zq := Z/qZ, i.e., Zq is the set of integers (mod q). For k ∈ N, we let [k] := {0, . . . , k − 1}. All
logarithms will be taken with respect to the base 2. A function µ :N→ R is said to be negligible
in a parameter λ ≥ 1, which we denote negl(λ), if it satisfies the following:
for every integer t > 0, there exists an integer Kt > 0 such that for all λ > Kt , we have |µ(λ)| < λ−t .
Similarly, a function η : N → R is said to be non-negligible in λ if there exists an integer t > 0
and Kt > 0 such that η(λ) ≥ λ−t for all λ > Kt . For a distribution D : {0,1}n → [0,1], we write
x ∼D to say that x is drawn according to the distributionD. For simplicity, we say that a function
f (n) = poly(n), if there exist constants a,b > 0 such that na < f (n) < nb.
An algorithm A is said to have oracle access to a function f , which is denoted by Af , if A is
allowed to (classically) query f (x) for every x in the domain of f with unit computational cost.
When A is a quantum algorithm, it is said to have quantum oracle access to f , denoted by A|f 〉, if
A is allowed to perform the operation∑xαx,b |x〉|b〉 →∑x,bαx,b |x〉|f (x)⊕b〉with unit computational
cost for every x ∈ {0,1}n,b ∈ {0,1} and αx,b ∈C
We say there is a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing D from another distribution D′ if
there is a poly(n)-time adversary Adv (i.e., algorithm) such that∣∣∣∣ Pr
x1,...,xL∼D
[Adv(x1, . . . ,xL) = 1]− Pr
x1,...,xL∼D′
[Adv(x1, ...,xL) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ η(n),
where η(n) is a non-negligible function and L is a polynomial in n.
Analogously, we say that there is a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the functions
f , f ′ : X → Y if there is a poly(n)-time adversary Adv (i.e., algorithm) that has oracle access to f
or f ′ such that ∣∣∣∣Pr[Advf () = 1]−Pr[Advf ′ () = 1]∣∣∣∣ ≥ η(n),
where η(n) is a non-negligible function. Here n is some security parameters and |X |, |Y | scale with
n. If Adv instead has quantum oracle access to a function f , we denote it by Adv|f 〉.
2.2 Information theory and communication complexity
We describe some basic concepts in information theory that we use later. Given a probability
distribution D : X → [0,1], the entropy of a random variable X ∼D is given by
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
Pr
X∼D
[X = x] log
(
Pr
X∼D
[X = x]
)
.
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The binary entropy of ε ∈ [0,1] is defined as Hb(ε) = −ε logε − (1− ε) log(1− ε). Moreover, Hb(ε)
can be upper bounded as follows.
Fact 2.1 For all ε ∈ [0,1/2] we have the binary entropy Hb(ε) ≤ O(ε log(1/ε)), and from the Taylor
series expansion of Hb(ε), we have
1−Hb(1/2+ ε) ≤ 2ε2/ ln2 +O(ε4).
Given a probability distribution D : X ×Y → [0,1], and the random variables (X,Y ) ∼ D, the
conditional entropy of X given Y is
H(X |Y ) = −
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
Pr
(X,Y )∼D
[(X,Y ) = (x,y)] log
(Pr(X,Y )∼D [(X,Y ) = (x,y)]
PrX∼D[X = x]
)
.
Given a probability distribution D : X × Y × Z → [0,1], the random variables (X,Y ,Z) ∼ D, the
conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z is
I(X : Y |Z) =H(X |Z)−H(X |Y,Z).
The following fact about conditional entropy and prediction errors will be useful for us.
Lemma 2.2 (Fano’s inequality) Let X be a random variable taking values in {0,1} and Y be a random
variables taking values in Y . Let f : Y → {0,1} be a prediction function, which predicts the value
of X based on an observation of Y . Suppose ε = Pr[f (Y ) , X] is the probability of error made by the
prediction function, then H(X |Y ) ≤Hb(ε).
We now briefly describe communication complexity. For details, we refer the reader to [Tou15,
KLGR16]. Here, we are interested in the setup with two parties Alice (denoted A) and Bob (de-
noted B). A (resp. B) receives input X (resp. Y ) such that (X,Y ) ∼ D for a publicly known prob-
ability distribution D. A and B then follow some protocol π in which they exchange quantum
information back-and-forth. Finally, B outputs a random variable Z. The quantum communica-
tion complexity of the protocol QCC(π) is the number of qubits communicated in the protocol π.
Touchette [Tou15] defined the notion of quantum information complexity for a protocol, de-
noted QIC(π), which is rather subtle and out of the scope of this work. In [Tou15, Theorem 1],
Touchette showed that for all protocols π, we have QIC(π) ≤ QCC(π). Similarly, Kerenidis et
al. [KLGR16, Theorem 1] showed that QIC(π) is at most the classical information complexity of
the protocol CIC(π), whose definition we omit here. Also, it is not hard to see that if B outputs
some value Z, then
I(Z : X |Y ) ≤ CIC(π).
Putting together [Tou15, Theorem 1] and [KLGR16, Theorem 1] along with the inequality above,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3 Given a quantum communication protocol π between two parties A and B whose inputs
are X and Y , respectively, drawn from a distribution D. Let Z be the output of B. Then,
I(Z : X |Y ) ≤QCC(π).
2.3 Cryptographic primitives
Definition 2.4 (Pseudo-random functions) Let n be security parameter, X , K and Y be finite sets
and F = {fk : X → Y} be family of functions indexed by k ∈ K. F is called a pseudo-random function
family if, for every polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm Adv and for every constant c > 0 we have∣∣∣∣ Pr
fk∈F
[Advfk(·) = 1]− Pr
g∈U
[Advg (·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < 1
sc
,
where fk is picked uniformly at random from F and g is picked uniformly at random from U , the set of
all functions from X to Y .
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In this work, we also consider quantum polynomial-time distinguishers. In short, when we
say that a pseudo-random function is secure, we mean that it satisfies Definition 2.4 and it is
quantum-secure if it satisfies a variation of Definition 2.4 where Adv is a polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithm and has quantum query access to the functions fk and g . We point out that such a
distinction is important. For example, there are examples of PRFs that are secure against (quan-
tum) adversaries with classical oracle access to the function, but that are not secure when the
adversary is allowed to perform quantum queries [BDF+11].
2.4 Learning models
2.4.1 Classical distribution-independent learning
We begin by introducing the classical Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of learning
which was introduced by Leslie Valiant [Val84]. A concept class C is a collection of Boolean func-
tions c : {0,1}n → {0,1}, which are often referred to as concepts. In the PAC model, a learner A is
given access to a random example oracle EX(c,D) where c ∈ C is an unknown target concept (which
the learner is trying to learn) andD : {0,1}n → [0,1] is an unknown distribution. At each invocation
of EX(c,D) the oracle returns a labelled example (x,c(x)) where x is drawn from the distributionD.10
Then A outputs a hypothesis h and we say that A is an (ε,δ)-PAC learner for a concept class C if it
satisfies the following:
for every ε,δ ∈ [0,1], for all c ∈ C and distributions D, when A is given ε,δ and access
to the EX(c,D) oracle, with probability ≥ 1− δ, A outputs a hypothesis h such that
Pr
x∼D
[h(x) , c(x)] ≤ ε
The learner’s advantage over a random guess is given by β = 12 − ε2 and 2β = 1− ε is called the
bias of the learner.
The sample complexity ofA is the maximum number of invocations of the EX(c,D) oracle which
the learner makes when maximized over all c ∈ C and all distributions D. Finally the (ε,δ)-PAC
sample complexity of C is defined as the minimum sample complexity over all A that (ε,δ)-PAC
learn C. The time complexity of (ε,δ)-PAC learning C is the minimum number of time steps of
an algorithm A that (ε,δ)-PAC learns C (where the minimum is over all A that (ε,δ)-PAC learn
C). We say that A (ε,δ)−weakly learns (resp. strongly learns) C if ε = 12 − n−c (resp. ε = 1/3) for
some constant c > 0 and input size n. Freund et al. [FSA99] showed that weak-PAC learning C is
equivalent to strong-PAC learning.
2.4.2 Quantum distribution-independent learning
The quantum model of PAC learning was introduced by Bshouty and Jackson [BJ99]. Instead of
having access to an EX(c,D) oracle, here a quantum-PAC learner has access to a QEX(c,D) oracle
QEX(c,D) : |0n,0〉 →
∑
x
√
D(x)|x,c(x)〉,
and we leave the QEX(c,D) oracle undefined on other basis states. We refer to the state produced
by QEX(c,D) as a quantum example, which is a coherent superposition over classical labeled ex-
amples. A quantum-PAC learner is given access to copies of quantum examples and performs a
POVM (positive-valued-operator measurement), where each outcome of the POVM corresponds
10Note that the oracle EX(c,D) doesn’t take any input and simply returns a labelled example.
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to a hypothesis. Similar to the classical distribution-independent learning setting, the quantum
sample complexity of an algorithm A is the maximum number of invocations of the QEX(c,D)
oracle which the learner makes, when maximized over all c ∈ C and all distributionsD. The (ε,δ)-
quantum PAC sample complexity of C is defined as the minimum quantum sample complexity over
all A that (ε,δ)-quantum-PAC learn C.
2.4.3 Uniform distribution learning
The classical PACmodel of learning places a strong requirement on learners, i.e., the learner needs
to (ε,δ)-PAC learn C for every unknown distribution D. In classical learning theory, there has been
a lot of work in understanding a weaker model of learning – when D is restricted to the uniform
distribution on {0,1}n (which we denote as U ). In this restricted model, a classical learner is given
access to EX(c,U ) (known to the learner) which generates (x,c(x)) where x is sampled according
to the uniform distribution U . An algorithm A is said to (ε,δ)-learn C under U if it satisfies the
following:
for every ε,δ ∈ [0,1], for all c ∈ C, when A is given ε,δ and access to the EX(c,U ) oracle,
with probability ≥ 1− δ, A outputs a hypothesis h such that Prx∼U [h(x) , c(x)] ≤ ε
The sample complexity and time complexity of learning C under the uniform distribution is
defined similar to Section 2.4.1 when we fix D = U .
One can similarly consider the case when a quantum learner is given access to QEX(c,U )
QEX(c,U ) : |0n,0〉 → 1√
2n
∑
x
|x,c(x)〉.
We leave QEX undefined on other basis states and assume the learner does not have access to the
inverse of QEX(c,U ). The quantum sample complexity and time complexity of learning a concept
class C under the uniform distribution is defined similar to Section 2.4.2 when we restrict D = U .
A powerful advantage of being given access to QEX(c,U ) is Fourier sampling. We do not introduce
Fourier sampling here and refer the interested reader to [AW17, Section 2.2.2].
2.4.4 Learning with membership queries
The classical model of PAC learning places yet another strong requirement on learners, i.e., the
learner is only given access to labelled examples generated by the oracle EX(c,D) (for an unknown
c ∈ C and distributionD). Angluin [Ang87] relaxed this requirement and introduced the model of
learning withmembership queries. In this scenario, in addition to EX(c,D), a learner is given access
to a membership oracle MQ(c) for the unknown target concept c, which takes as input x ∈ {0,1}n
and returns c(x). An algorithm A is said to (ε,δ)-learn C under D with membership queries if it
satisfies the following:
for every ε,δ ∈ [0,1], for all c ∈ C, whenA is given ε,δ and access to EX(c,D), MQ(c) ora-
cles, with probability≥ 1−δ,A outputs a hypothesis h such that Prx∼D[h(x) , c(x)] ≤ ε.
We abuse notation by saying the sample complexity ofA is themaximumnumber of invocations of
an oracle11 when maximized over all c ∈ C under distributionD. The sample complexity and time
complexity of learning C under D given membership queries is defined similar to Section 2.4.1
(where the classical learner now has access to MQ(c) in addition to EX(c,D)).
11Note that an invocation of either EX(c,D) or MQ(c) counts as one application of the oracle.
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One can similarly consider the case when a quantum learner is additionally given access to a
quantum membership query oracle QMQ(c)
QMQ(c) : |x,b〉 → |x,b ⊕ c(x)〉,
for x ∈ {0,1}n and b ∈ {0,1}. The quantum learner is allowed to perform arbitrary unitary op-
erations in between applications of the QMQ(c) oracle. The quantum sample complexity and
time complexity of learning C under D given quantum membership queries is defined similar to
Section 2.4.2 (where the classical learner now has access to QMQ(c) in addition to QEX(c,D)).
In this paper, we will also view the concept as as c ∈ {0,1}2n , described by the truth-table of
c : {0,1}n → {0,1}. In this case, we say a learning algorithm is allowed to make queries to a string
c ∈ {0,1}N , it means that the algorithm is given access to the oracle QMQ(c) : |x,b〉 → |b ⊕ cx〉 for
x ∈ [N ] and b ∈ {0,1}.
Learning with membership queries under the uniform distribution. Finally, one can combine
the learning models in this section with Section 2.4.3 and consider (quantum) learners which
are given access to (quantum) membership queries and (quantum) labelled examples when the
underlying distributionD is restricted to the uniform distribution U . We sayA is an (ε,δ)-uniform
PAC learner for C with membership queries if A (ε,δ)-learns C under U with membership queries.
Similarly we can define a (ε,δ)-uniform quantum-PAC learner for C with quantum membership
queries. In this paper we will consider such learners in the weak and strong learning settings, and
for simplicity we will omit the (ε,δ)-dependence when referring to the classical-PAC or quantum-
PAC learners. The sample complexity and time complexity of such learners is defined similar
to Section 2.4.1, 2.4.2 (wherein the classical learner now has access to EX(c,U ) and MQ(c) and
the quantum learner has access to QEX(c,U ) and QMQ(c)). In order to further understand the
theoretical aspects of quantum machine learning, we refer the reader to [SP18, AAD+15, AW17].
2.5 Circuits and neural networks
In this paper we will be concerned with the class of shallow or constant-depth Boolean circuits
that consist of AND,OR,NOT and Majority gates. We define these classes formally now.
2.5.1 The circuit classes AC0 and TC0
An AC0 circuit on n bits consists of AND,OR and NOT gates whose inputs are x1, . . . ,xn,x1, . . . ,xn.
Fan-in to the AND and OR gates are unbounded. The size of the circuit (i.e., the number of gates
in the AC0 circuit) is bounded by a polynomial in n and the depth of the circuit is a constant (i.e.,
independent of n). Furthermore, the gates at level i of the circuit have all their inputs coming from
the (i − 1)-th level and all the gates at the same level are AND or OR gates. The class of Boolean
functions that can be expressed by such a depth-d circuit is written as AC0d and AC
0 =
⋃
d≥0AC0d . A
depth-d threshold circuit, denoted TC0d , is similar to an AC
0
d circuit, except that the circuit is also
allowed to have Majority gates MAJ : {0,1}n → {0,1}, where MAJ(x) = 1 if and only if∑i xi ≥ n/2.
Additionally, we will need the following definition of halfspaces and polynomial threshold
functions in order to discuss about depth-2 TC02 circuits. A half-space in n dimensions is a Boolean
function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} of the form
f (x) =


∑
i
aixi ≥ θ


where a1, . . . ,an and θ are fixed integers and ~· denotes the indicator function which evaluates to 1
if and only if
∑
i aixi ≥ θ. The intersection of k half-spaces is a function of the form g(x) =
∧k
i=1 fi(x)
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where the fis are half-spaces and ∧ is the AND function. A polynomial threshold function (PTF) of
degree d is a Boolean function of the form f (x) = ~p(x) ≥ 0, where p is a degree-d polynomial with
integer coefficients. Note that a half-space is a degree-1 PTF. A PTF f , defined as f (x) = ~p(x) ≥ 0,
is called light if the sum of the absolute value of the coefficients in p is at most polynomial in n.
Using this, we now have the following claim.
Claim 2.5 A polynomially-light halfspace on n dimensions can be computed in TC02.
Proof. First observe that each half-space on n bits is already a majority gate (with the inputs
suitably negative and replicated based on the coefficients a1, . . . ,an) and the top gate AND(f1, . . . , ft)
can be replaced by the majority gate MAJ(−t, f1, . . . , ft), which is a depth-2 threshold circuit. 
Neural networks and TC0. One motivation for learning the concept class TC0 is that this class
is a theoretical way to model neural networks. Although we do not deal with neural networks
in this paper, we briefly mention their connection to TC0 circuits. A feed-forward neural network
can be modeled as an acyclic directed graph where the nodes consist of neurons.12 Every neuron
is associated with some internal weights w0, . . . ,wn ∈ R. The action of the neuron is defined as
follows: it takes as real input x1, . . . ,xn and generates an output signal y defined by
y = σ
(∑
i∈[n]
wixi −w0
)
,
where σ is a transfer function. The size of a neural network is the number of neurons in the network
and the depth of the network is the number of layers in the network between the input and final
output. A commonly used transfer function is the sigmoid function, defined as σ(t) = (1 + e−t)−1.
The sigmoid function is a continuous approximation of the threshold function Thrw0,w1,...,wn , which
on input x1, . . . ,xn, outputs 1 if
∑
iwixi ≥ w0 and 0 otherwise. Maass, Schnitger and Sontag [MSS91]
showed an equivalence between feed-forward neural networks and TC0 circuits. Before we state
their theorem, we first define the following:
Definition 2.6 Let ε > 0 and f : {0,1}n → {0,1} be a Boolean function. We say a feed-forward neural
network C ε-computes f , if there exists a tC ∈ R such that: on input x ∈ {0,1}n, C(x) ≥ tC+ε if f (x) = 1
and C(x) ≤ tC − ε if f (x) = 0.
We now state the main result of [MSS91].
Theorem 2.7 (Theorem 4.1[MSS91]) Let d ≥ 1. Let Td be the class of functions f : {0,1}n → {0,1}
such that there exists a depth-d feed-forward neural network C on n bits, whose size is poly(n), the
individual weights in C have absolute value at most poly(n) and C 13 -computes f . Then, Td = TC
0
d .
13
In particular, this theorem implies that Boolean functions that are computable by constant-
depth polynomial-sized neural networks with neuron-weights bounded by some polynomial in
the input size, can be implemented as a circuit in TC0. So an alternate definition of TC0 is the
class of constant-depth neural networks with polynomial size and weights bounded polynomially
in the input length.
12In general, neural networks are cyclic directed graphs. In order to make the connection to TC0 we consider a
subclass of neural networks called feed-forward neural-networks.
13The 1/3 can be replaced by an arbitrary constant independent of n.
19
3 Hardness assumptions and cryptographic constructions
In this section we give a detailed introduction to lattice-based problems and some cryptographic
primitives built using them. Our motivation in doing this, firstly, is to highlight the subtleties
inherent in the hardness results and security proofs associated with these lattice-based problems
and primitives respectively. Secondly, the details also help in explaining the subtleties that are
reflected in our utilization of these primitives for showing the hardness of quantum learning.
3.1 Learning with Errors (LWE)
Throughout this section, we will need the following notation. Let χ be a distribution over Z
and assume that we can efficiently sample from χ.14 Let B > 0. We say that χ is B-bounded if
Pre∼χ[|e| > B] ≤ µ(n), where e,B are at most n bits long and µ is a function that is negligible in
n. In other words, a distribution χ is B-bounded if, with high probability, the magnitude of e
when drawn according to χ is at most B. Also, a discrete Gaussian refers to the standard normal
Gaussian distribution on the real line which is restricted to take integer values. Now, we can
define the decision version of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem.
Definition 3.1 (LWEd,q,χ,m) The (decision) Learning with Errors problem with dimension d, modu-
lus q and a B-bounded distribution χ over Z is defined as follows: On input m independent samples
{(ai ,bi ) ∈ Zdq × Zq}i , where the ai are uniformly sampled from Zdq , distinguish (with non-negligible
advantage) between the following two cases:
• (LWE-samples) The bis are noisy products with respect to a fixed secret s distributed uniformly
in Zdq , i.e., bis are of the form bi = ai · s + ei (mod q) where ei ∈ Z is sampled according to χ
conditioned on |ei | ≤ B.
• (Uniform samples) For every i, bi is uniformly sampled from Zq and is independent of ai .
When the number of samples m is arbitrary (i.e., not bounded in terms of the dimension d), we
will simply denote the problem as LWEd,q,χ.
Consider an efficient distinguisherD as defined in Definition 2.4 that distinguishes a distribu-
tionD from being uniformly random. Then, ifD is the distribution generated by LWE-samples, the
distinguisher D would clearly serve as an efficient algorithm to solve the (decision) LWE problem.
We formally define this below.
Definition 3.2 (Distinguishers for LWEd,q,χ,m) An algorithm D is a distinguisher for the (decision)
LWEd,q,χ,m problem if, given m independent samples from Z
d
q × Zq, it distinguishes m LWE-samples
{ai ,b(1)i }i from m uniformly random samples {ai ,b
(2)
i }i with non-negligible advantage i.e., there exists a
non-negligible function η :N→ R such that∣∣∣∣ Pr
(ai ,b
(1)
i )
[D({ai ,b(1)i }i ) outputs 1]− Pr
(ai ,b
(2)
i )
[D({ai ,b(2)i }i ) outputs 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ η(d).
WhenD is a poly(d,m)-time probabilistic (resp. quantum) algorithm, it is said to be an efficient classical
(resp. quantum) distinguisher.
14The distribution χ is dependent on input size n, but we drop the n-dependence for notational simplicity.
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3.1.1 Hardness of LWE
For a suitable choice of parameters, it is believed that LWE is a hard problem to solve. This is
based on the worst-case hardness of lattice-based problems such as GapSVPγ (decision version of
the shortest vector problem) or SIVP (shortest independent vectors problem) [Reg09, Pei09]. We
do not introduce these problems or discuss their hardness here; an interested reader can refer to
Peikert’s survey [Pei16] on the topic.
The first hardness result for LWE was a quantum reduction to the GapSVP problem [Reg09,
Pei09]. Subsequent works succeeded in de-quantizing the reduction from [Reg09] except that
the modulus q was required to be super-polynomial in the dimension d [Pei09]. Later, Brakerski
et al. [BLP+13] built on this result and other techniques from fully homomorphic encryption,
obtaining a reduction with a polynomial modulus.
Theorem 3.3 (Hardness of LWE [BLP+13]) Let d,q ≥ 1 and α ∈ (0,1) be such that q = poly(d) and
αq ≥ 2d. LetDZq,α be the discrete Gaussian distribution overZq with standard deviation αq. Then there
exists a classical reduction from the worst-case hardness of the d-dimensional GapSVPO˜(d/α) problem to
the LWEd2,q,DZq ,α problem.
The corollary below provides a suitable choice for parameters that lead to hard LWE instances.
Corollary 3.4 Let d ∈ N and α,q be parameters such that α = 1/√d and αq ≥ 2√d. Let χ = DZq,α ,
the discrete Gaussian distribution overZq with standard deviation αq. If there exists a polynomial-time
quantum distinguisher for LWEd,q,χ,m, then there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the√
d-dimensional GapSVPO˜(d1.5) problem.
It is believed that there exists no polynomial-time quantum algorithms for the d-dimensional
GapSVPO˜(d3) problem [GG00], which implies that there are no quantum polynomial-time algo-
rithms for LWE with the parameters as stated in Corollary 3.4.
We would like to stress that we show hardness results for learning constant-depth circuits with
quantum examples, based on the hardness of solving LWE with classical samples. This does not
contradict the work by Grilo et al. [GKZ19] who prove that LWE is easy when quantum examples
are provided.
3.1.2 Public-key encryption scheme based on LWE
In this sectionwe describe the public-key cryptosystem proposed by Regev [Reg09] whose security
is based on the hardness of LWE.
Definition 3.5 (LWE−PKE [Reg09]) The LWE− PKEd,q,m public-key encryption scheme consists of:
Key-generation: Pick s ∈ Zdq and A ∈ Zm×dq uniformly at random from the respective supports. Draw
e ∈Zdq from the distribution χ, as defined in the LWE problem. Let b = As+ e and output Kpriv = s and
Kpub = (A,b).
Encryption: To encrypt a bit c usingKpub = (A,b), pick S ⊆ [m] uniformly at random and the encryption
is
(
1TS ·A,1TS · b+ c⌊ q2⌋
)
, where 1S ∈ {0,1}m is defined as 1S (i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ S
Decryption: In order to decrypt the ciphertext (a,b) using Kpriv = s, output 0 if b − aT s (mod q) ≤ ⌊ q4⌋,
otherwise output 1.
Theorem 3.6 Let d ∈N, ε > 0 be a constant, q = poly(d) and m ≥ (1 + ε)(d + 1)logq be polynomially
bounded in d. Then, the probability of decryption error for LWE− PKEd,q,m is 2−ω(d2/m). Moreover, an
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adversary can distinguish an encryption of 0 from an encryption of 1 in polynomial time with non-
negligible advantage over a random guess iff there is a polynomial-time distinguisher for LWEd,q,χ,m.
The following property of LWE− PKE was proven by Klivans and Sherstov [KS09].
Lemma 3.7 (Lemma 4.3 [KS09]) The decryption function of LWE− PKE can be computed by light
degree-2 PTFs.
3.2 Ring-LWE
One of the main drawbacks of LWE-based cryptographic primitives is that their representations
are not compact, which makes them inefficient to implement. To overcome this, Lyubashevsky et
al. [LPR13a] proposed a variant of LWE over polynomial rings, called Ring-LWE. Unfortunately,
the efficiency of implementing Ring-LWE does not come for free: first, the average-case hardness
of Ring-LWE is currently supported only by the worst-case hardness of problems on ideal lattices;
and secondly the reduction is still (partly) quantum (see Section 3.2.1 for further discussion).
The following notation will be used whenever we refer to the ring variants of lattice problems.
Let R be a degree-d cyclotomic ring of the form R :=Z[X]/〈Xd +1〉 where d is a power of 2. In par-
ticular, the elements of Rwill be represented by their residues modulo (Xd +1) – which are integer
polynomials of degree less than d. For an integer modulus q, we let Rq := R/qR =Zq[X]/〈Xd +1〉
where its elements are canonically represented by integer polynomials of degree less than d with
coefficients from Zq.
Let Υ denote an efficiently sampleable distribution over the elements of R that is concentrated
on elements having B-bounded integer coefficients, i.e., let Υ be a variant of the d-dimensional
discrete Gaussian distributionwhere each coefficient of the integer polynomial (in some canonical
representation) is B-bounded with overwhelmingly high probability. As with LWE, the Ring-LWE
problem focuses on finding a secret ring element s ∈ Rq when given noisy ring products (a, a ·s+e)
as samples where · and + refer to the multiplication and addition operations in Rq.
Definition 3.8 (RLWEd,q,Υ,m) The (decision) Ring Learning with Errors problem with dimension d,
modulus q and a B-bounded distribution Υ over R is defined as follows: On input m independent sam-
ples {(ai ,bi ) ∈ Rq ×Rq}i , where the ai are uniformly sampled from Rq, distinguish (with non-negligible
advantage) between the following two cases:
• (RLWE-samples) The bis are noisy products with respect to a fixed secret s distributed uniformly
in Rq, i.e., bis are of the form bi = ai · s+ ei (mod q) where ei ∈ R is sampled according to Υ.
• (Uniform samples) For every i, bi is uniformly sampled from Rq and is independent of ai .
Note that, similar to Definition 3.2, we can also consider distinguishers, D, for the ring-LWE
problem RLWEd,q,Υ,m. At times, we will consider the normal form of the problem where the secret
is sampled from the error distribution modulo q i.e., s← χd (mod q). It is known, from [LPR13b],
that this form of the problem is as hard as the problem in Definition 3.8.
3.2.1 Hardness of Ring-LWE
Lyubashevsky, et. al. [LPR13a] first showed a worst-case hardness reduction from the shortest
vector problem SVPγ on a class of structured lattices called ideal lattices to Ring-LWE. It is be-
lieved that SVPγ is hard in the worst case, even for quantum algorithms. For instance, the best
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known quantum algorithms for (general) SVPpoly(d) still run in time 2
O(d). Although the hardness
reduction between Ring-LWE and SVPγ uses ideal lattices, the hardness assumptions for SVPpoly(d)
are still fairly standard. One caveat here is that that reduction poses restrictions on the types of
rings and requires that the modulus q = poly(d). For more on this subject, we direct the interested
reader to Peikert’s survey [Pei16].
Subsequently, Langlois and Stehle´ [LS15] improved the hardness result for anymodulus q with
poly(d) bit-size (therefore q can be super-polynomial in d). More recently, Peikert et al. [PRS17]
further improved the hardness result to work for every ring and modulus by obtaining a direct
reduction from the worst-case hardness of the SIVPγ (find approximately short independent vec-
tors in a lattice of length within a γ-factor of the optimum) on ideal lattices to the (decision)
RLWEd,q,Υ,m problem. We use the following result from their work applied to cyclotomic rings.
Theorem 3.9 (Quantum Reduction from [PRS17]) Let R be a degree-d cyclotomic ring and let m =
poly(d). Let α = α(d) ∈ (0,1) and q = q(d) ≥ 2 be an integer such that α ≤ 1/2√logd/d and αq ≥ ω(1).
Let Υ be a d-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution over R with standard deviation at most αq in
each coefficient. Then, there exists a polynomial-time quantum reduction from the d-dimensional SIVPγ
over R to the RLWEd,q,Υ,m problem for any γ ≤max{ω(
√
d logd/α),
√
2d}.
When γ = O˜(poly(d)), the best known quantum algorithms for SIVPγ are still expected to take
exponential time and any sub-exponential time algorithm for these approximation factors will be
considered a breakthrough in the cryptography and quantum community. Based on this, we will
use the following three assumptions on the hardness of RLWE in the remainder of this work.
Assumption 1 (Polynomial time hardness) Let 0 < τ < 1, d ∈N, q = 2O(dτ ), r ≤ poly(d) and Υ(r)
be the discrete Gaussian distribution over degree-d cyclotomic rings with standard deviation at most r
in each coefficient. The RLWEd,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for a poly(d)-time quantum computer.
Assumption 1 is used in Corollary 4.5 to show that TC0 cannot be learned in polynomial time.
Assumption 2 (Quasi-polynomial time hardness) Let 0 < τ < 1, d ∈ N, q = 2O(dτ ), r ≤ poly(d)
andΥ(r) be the discrete Gaussian distribution over degree-d cyclotomic rings with standard deviation at
most r in each coefficient. The RLWEd,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for a 2
O(polylog(d))-time quantum computer.
Assumption 2 helps to show that TC0 cannot be learned in quasi-polynomial time in Corollary 4.5.
Assumption 3 (Strongly sub-exponential time hardness) Let 0 < τ < 1, 0 < ε < 12 , d ∈ N, q =
2O(d
τ ), r ≤ dλ for 0 < λ < 1/2−ε andΥ(r) be the discrete Gaussian distribution over degree-d cyclotomic
rings with standard deviation at most r in each coefficient. For every constant η > 2, the RLWEd,q,Υ(r)
problem is hard for a 2o(d
1/η )-time quantum computer.
Assumption 3 is used in Corollary 4.7 to show that AC0 cannot be learned in polynomial time.
3.3 Learning with Rounding (LWR)
While the hardness results for LWE and RLWE suggest that they are good candidates for quantum-
secure cryptographic primitives, the amount of randomness these schemes need to generate sam-
ples make them unsuitable for the construction of pseudo-random functions. For this reason, we
consider the Learning with Rounding problem (LWR) which was introduced by Banerjee, Peikert
and Rosen [BPR12] and can be seen as a deterministic variant of LWE.
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The following notation will be used in this section. For a,s ∈Zdq , let a·s be defined as
∑
j∈[d] ajsj
mod q. For q ≥ p ≥ 2, we define ⌊·⌉p : Zq → Zp as ⌊x⌉p = ⌊(p/q) · x⌉ where ⌊·⌉ denotes the closest
integer. Additionally, when x is a ring element in Rq, we extend this rounding operation to rings
as follows: define ⌊·⌉p : Rq → Rp as the operation where each polynomial coefficient xi ∈Zq of x is
rounded to Zp as ⌊xi⌉p respectively. From here onwards, we assume that q has a poly(d) bit size,
i.e. logq ≤O(poly(d)), and, without loss of generality, that p, and q are powers of 2.
Definition 3.10 (LWRd,q,p,m) The (decision) Learning with Rounding problem with dimension d, mod-
ulus q and rounding modulus p < q is defined as follows: on input m independent samples {(ai ,bi ) ∈
Z
d
q ×Zp}i where the ai ’s are sampled uniformly from Zdq , distinguish (with non-negligible advantage)
between the following two cases:
• (LWR-samples) There is a fixed secret s uniformly sampled from Zdq such that the bis are rounded
products with respect to s, i.e., bi = ⌊ai · s⌉p for every i.
• (Uniform samples) For every i, bi is uniformly sampled from Zp and is independent of ai .
As LWR inherits all issues of inefficient implementation exhibited by LWE, we are particularly
interested in the ring version of this problem namely, Learning with Rounding over Rings. This is
defined below.
Definition 3.11 (RLWRd,q,p,m) The (decision) Learning with Rounding problem with dimension d,
modulus q and rounding modulus p < q is defined as follows: on inputm independent samples {(ai ,bi ) ∈
Rq × Rp}i where the ai ’s are sampled uniformly from Rq, distinguish (with non-negligible advantage)
between the following two cases:
• (RLWR-samples) There is a fixed secret s uniformly sampled from Rq such that the bis are rounded
ring products with respect to s, i.e., bi = ⌊ai · s⌉p for every i.
• (Uniform samples) For every i, bi is uniformly sampled from Rp and is independent of ai .
While the definition above samples a secret uniformly from Rq, an equivalent problem sam-
ples s using the RLWE error distribution Υ (mod q). This will have a bearing when we consider
pseudo-random functions constructed from RLWR. When the number of samples is arbitrary, the
corresponding problems are denoted as LWRd,q,p and RLWRd,q,p . Similar to Definition 3.2 of dis-
tinguishers for LWEd,q,χ,m one could analogously define classical and quantum distinguishers for
the LWRd,q,p,m and RLWRd,q,p,m problems.
3.3.1 PRFs from the LWR problem
The hardness reduction in [BPR12] from RLWRd,q,p,m (resp. LWRd,q,p,m) to RLWEd,q,Υ (resp. LWEd,q,χ)
for q = superpoly(d) implies that these problems may be hard for quantum computers. This
makes them good candidates from which to construct quantum-secure PRFs. The following PRF
construction from [BPR12, Section 5] will be of importance to us.
Definition 3.12 (RLWE degree-k PRF) For parameters d ∈ N, moduli q ≥ p ≥ 2 and input length
k ≥ 1, let R be a degree-d cyclotomic ring. The RLWE−PRFd,q,p,k function family RF is defined as
RF := {fa,s1,...,sk : {0,1}k → Rp} where a ∈ Rq, si ∈ Rq for i ∈ [k] and
fa,s1,...,sk (x) :=
⌊
a ·Πi∈[k]sxii
⌉
p
where ⌊·⌉p denotes the rounding procedure over ring elements.
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Clearly, every function in the familyRF defined above, outputs a ring element from Rp. How-
ever, for the purposes of constructing the simplest concept class that is hard to learn, we would
prefer a PRF that outputs a single bit. We can achieve this by modifying the construction to out-
put the most significant bit of the PRFs output from Definition 3.12 and denote it as the One-Bit
RLWR PRF (1B−RPRF) as defined below.
Definition 3.13 (One-Bit RLWR PRF) For parameters d ∈N and moduli q ≥ p ≥ 2, let R be a degree-
d cycolotomic ring. Let φp : Rq → {0,1} be defined as φp(g) = msb
(⌊
g
⌉
p
)
where msb(·) for a ring
element denotes the most significant bit of it’s first polynomial coefficient. For an input length k ≥
1, the 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k function family RF is defined as RF := {fa,s1,...,sk : {0,1}k → {0,1}} where
a,s1, . . . ,sk ∈ Rq and
fa,s1,...,sk (x) = φp
(
a ·Πi∈[k]sixi
)
.
Note that the definition above is equivalent for φ outputting any arbitrary fixed bit from the
representation of the ring element. [BPR12] showed that the RLWE degree-k PRFs are both se-
cure against classical adversaries. Combining techniques from [BPR12] and [Zha12],15 one can
conclude in a fairly straightforward manner that the RLWE degree-k PRF is also secure against
quantum adversaries under the RLWE assumption. For completeness, we show how this security
proof also implies the security of the One-Bit RLWR PRFs.
Lemma 3.14 If the RLWE degree-k PRF is quantum-secure, then so is the One-Bit RLWR PRF.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a distinguisher D for the One-Bit RLWR PRF. This means
that D can make (quantum) queries to an oracle O and can distinguish if O is a function picked
from the One-Bit RLWR PRF family or a uniformly random Boolean function.
We construct a distinguisher D′ for the RLWE degree-k PRF that uses D as a sub-routine. By
definition,D′ has (quantum) query access to an oracleO′ that is either a function picked from the
RLWE degree-k PRF family or a uniformly random function that outputs an element from Rp.
In order to use D as a sub-routine successfully, D′, using queries to its oracle O′, simulates an
oracle O˜ that will answer the (quantum) queries from D. In this case, O˜ is a function from One-
Bit RLWR PRF when O′ is a function from RLWE degree-k PRF, or a uniformly random Boolean
function otherwise. Using the definition of O˜ and the fact that D is a distinguisher for the One-Bit
RLWR PRF, one can conclude that D′ is indeed a distinguisher for the RLWE degree-k PRF.
We finish the proof by showing how D′ can simulate O˜ using queries to O′. We now describe
the action of O˜ on the query |x〉|y〉 made by D′ – without loss of generality, it suffices to define the
actions of O˜ the basis states since as the operations of D′ are unitary. D′ makes a call to O′ using a
|x〉 as the input register and fresh ancilla bits set to |0〉 as the output register, resulting in |x〉|y〉|z〉,
where z = O′(x). D′ computes the state |x〉|y ⊕ z1〉|z〉, where z1 denotes the first bit of z, followed
by a second query to O′ using the first and third registers as the input and output registers,
respectively. D′ then discards the last register (which has value |0〉) and answers the query with
|x〉|y ⊕ z1〉.Notice that if O′ is an oracle to the RLWE degree-k PRF family, then O˜ is simulating a
function from the One-Bit RLWR PRF family; and if O′ is a random function, the first bit of the
representation of its output is a random bit, which ensures that O˜ is also a random function. 
Putting all the security proofs together, we obtain the choice of parameters that would make
some One-Bit RLWR PRF family quantum secure.
15Zhandry [Zha12] proved that the LWE degree-k PRF is also secure against quantum adversaries. This was done by
showing that the classical security of the PRF under the LWE assumption implies the quantum security under the same
assumption.
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Lemma 3.15 Let d ∈N, r > 0, 2 ≤ p≪ q and k = ω(logd) such that logq ≤O(poly(d)).
Let R be a degree-d cyclotomic ring and let Υ(r) be the d-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution
over R with standard deviation at most r in each coefficient. Let q ≥ p · k(r√d + k ·ω(logd))k · dω(1). Let
RF be the 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k function family where each secret si is independently drawn from Υ(r). If
RLWEd,q,Υ(r) is hard for an t(n)-time quantum computer, then RF is a quantum-secure pseudo-random
function family against O(t(n)) adversaries.
Proof Sketch. We begin with the security proof for the RLWE−PRFd,q,p,k against classical ad-
versaries as shown in [BPR12, Section 5]. By making adjustments almost identical to those in
Zhandry’s proof [Zha12, Section F] that was used to prove the quantum security of the LWE
base PRF, we conclude that the RLWE−PRFd,q,p,k is secure against quantum adversaries. Using
Lemma 3.14, we obtain the parameters q,p,k for which the 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k , RF is secure against
quantum adversaries. 
Next, we demonstrate that there exist efficient constant-depth circuit implementations for the
One-Bit RLWR PRF familyRF .
Lemma 3.16 Let d ∈ N, k = ω(logd), let q = dω(1) and 2 ≤ p ≤ q be powers of 2 such that logq ≤
O(poly(d)). Let R be the degree-d cyclotomic ring. Consider the 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k function familyRF de-
fined in Definition 3.13. For every a,s1, . . . ,sk ∈ Rq, fa,s1,...,sk ∈ RF can be computed by anO(poly(d,k))-
sized TC0 circuit.
Proof. From Definition 3.13, notice that given a k-bit input x, for any function fa,s1,...,sk ∈ RF ,
fa,s1,...,sk (x) can be computed as follows: (a) take the product of a with those secrets si for which
xi = 1 to obtain an element in Rq, (b) round it to an element in Rp and (c) output the first bit of
the representation of this element. Since q and p are powers of 2, the coefficient-wise rounding
procedure just truncates each coefficient to the logp most significant bits. Hence, the last two
steps can be efficiently executed by a poly(d)-sized TC0 circuit as there are most d coefficients to
round. It remains to show that computing the iteratedmultiplication of at most k+1 ring elements
can be performed using a TC0 circuit.
Recall that the ring elements, in the standard representation are stored as degree-d polyno-
mials and multiplication in this representation may not be efficient. However, using a canonical
embedding σ : Rq → Cd , arising from algebraic number theory, any ring element z ∈ Rq can be
mapped to the complex vector (z(ηi))i ∈ Cd where ηi is the ith complex root of (−1). In other
words, z can be efficiently stored as complex vectors of length d and each vector entry of size at
most O(logq) = O(polyd) bits. The advantage in this representation is that ring multiplication
reduces to coefficient wise multiplication of these vectors [LPR13a, LPR13b]. Now, Step (a) can be
broken up into the following operations:
1. Convert the k+1 ring elements a,s1, . . . ,sk into their canonical embeddings σ(a), {σ(si)}i∈[k] ∈ Cd .
2. Perform coordinate wise product of at most k +1-vectors in this embedding.
3. Convert the solution back into the standard representation, i.e., perform the inverse of the
embedding σ
The first and last steps to convert to and from the canonical embedding is performed us-
ing Fast Fourier Transforms (FFT) and its variants or the Chinese Remainder Representation
(CRR) [LPR13b] which can be executed in TC0 [RT92, HAB02]. The second step is just d-parallel
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iterated multiplications of at most k + 1 elements each of O(logq) = O(polyd)-bits which can be
performed by anO(poly(d,k))-sized TC0 circuit [HAB02]. Putting all the steps together, fa,s1,...,sk (x)
can be computed by an O(poly(d,k))-sized TC0 circuit. 
One problem that prevents us from computing any function from the family RF in smaller
circuit classes, say AC0, lies in the fact that performing FFT, the CRR embedding and iterated
multiplication cannot be done efficiently in AC0. However, we use two observations to demon-
strate that there exist sub-exponential sized AC0 circuits that compute functions in the family
RF : (i) arithmetic operations on O(polylogn)-bit numbers can be executed using poly(n)-sized
AC0 circuits16 [MT98]; (ii) iterated multiplication of t numbers each of length at most n bits can
be performed in poly(2n
ε
,2t
ε
)-sized AC0 circuits [HAB02, HV06]. We proceed by defining the
PRF with a smaller dimension in the underlying problem such that the PRF’s circuit size scales
sub-exponentially in the dimension. This resembles the technique used by Kharitonov [Kha93] to
show that some instances of the BBS PRG can be implemented in AC0.
Lemma 3.17 Let d ∈ N and choose constants c > η > 1 and ε < 1 such that ε ≤ ηη+c . Let d > 2 and
k = (d)
1
η . Choose 2 < p ≪ q = superpoly(d) as powers of 2 such that logq = k2k+1 logd. Consider the
1B−RPRFd,q,p,k family RF defined in Definition 3.13. For every a,s1, . . . ,sk ∈ Rq, fa,s1,...,sk ∈ RF can be
computed by a 2O(d
1/c)-sized AC0 circuit of depth O(1/ε).
Proof. For notational simplicity, we set d ′ = 2(d)1/c i.e., d = logc d ′ and proceed by first calculating
the circuit size in terms of d ′ . The proof follows the ideas used in the proof of Lemma 3.16.
Specifically, the operations performed to evaluate fa,s1,...,sk (x) break up in the same manner as
before. Also, note that the input to the circuit is determined by the k-bit string x.
Let us start our analysis with the rounding of some element from Rq to Rp. This can be done
by truncating each coefficient to the most significant logp bits where logp ≪ logq = k2k+1 logd ≤
k logd = O(polylogd ′) since d = logc d ′ and k = (d)1/η = logc/η d ′ . From observation (i) above, this
truncation can be performed by a poly(d ′)-sized AC0 circuit for each of the d coefficients.
In order to deal with the iterated multiplication of a ∈ Rq with the secrets s1, . . . ,sk ∈ Rq, as
before we first convert the ring elements from their standard representation to the canonical em-
bedding σ : Rq → Cd so that every element z ∈ Rq is a complex vector of length d = O(polylogd ′)
and each vector entry of size at mostO(logq) =O(polylogd ′) bits [LPR13b]. The complexity of the
FFT and CRR operations needed to convert to and from the canonical embedding σ in this case
are constrained by the complexity of multiplication and exponentiation of O(logq)-bit numbers.
Then, using a variant of observation (ii) above that also works for exponentiation [HAB02, HV06],
these operations can be performed by poly
(
2(logq)
ε
,2k
ε)
-sized AC0 circuits of depth O(1/ε). Fi-
nally, for the d-parallel iterated multiplications of at most k + 1 elements each of O(logq)-bits, by
observation (ii) we need poly
(
2(logq)
ε
,2k
ε
)
-sized AC0 circuits of depth O(1/ε) to evaluate it.
The total circuit size for evaluating fa,s1,...,sk (x) hinges on the complexity of poly(2
(logq)ε ,2k
ε
)
which we show to be O(poly(d ′)) below. First, notice that 2kε ≤ 2( k2 logd)ε ≤ 2( k2k+1 logd)
ε
= 2(logq)
ε
for
16Basic arithmetic operations can be expressed by circuits containing AND, NOT, OR and MAJ gates. MAJ gates with
O(polylogn)-bit fan-in can be computed by AC0 circuits.
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d > 4. Hence, it suffices to bound only the complexity of the latter term in terms of d ′:
(logq)ε =
(
k2
k +1
logd
)ε
≤ (k logd)ε = (d) εη (logd)ε
(
Since, k = (d)
1
η
)
= (logd ′)
cε
η O((loglogd ′)ε) (Since, d = logc d ′)
≤ (logd ′) cεη O((logd ′)ε)
=O
(
(logd ′)
(
c
η+1
)
ε
)
=O
(
(logd ′)
c+η
η ε
)
=O(logd ′)
(
Since, ε ≤ η
η + c
)
,
which implies that 2(logq)
ε ≤ 2O(logd ′ ) =O(poly(d ′)).
Putting all the steps together, the function fa,s1,...,sk (x) taking as input a k-bit number x can
be computed by an AC0 circuit of size O(poly(d ′)) = O
(
poly
(
2d
1/c
))
= 2O(d
1/c) and depth scaling
as O(1/ε). 
4 Quantum-secure PRFs vs. quantum learning
In this section we prove our main theoremwhich shows the connection between efficient quantum
learning and quantum algorithms which serve as distinguishers for pseudo-random functions.
The structure of our proof goes in the same lines of the work of Kharitonov [Kha93, Kha92]:
we assume the existence of an efficient learner for some PRF F and utilize it to construct an
efficient distinguisher for F from truly random functions. However, we need here very different
techniques, since the arguments used by Kharitonov do not follow in the quantum setting.
A key part of the proof for this theorem hinges on bounding how well a quantum algorithm
predicts the output of a random function on a random input. We assume that the algorithm
is allowed to query an oracle to the function (in superposition) at most q times. Each of these
queries denotes performing a membership query to z, the truth-table of the function. We show an
upper bound on the probability of predicting the output of this random function for a uniformly
random input.
Lemma 4.1 Let k > 1 and f : {0,1}k → {0,1} be a random function. Consider a quantum algorithm
that makes q quantum membership queries to f . Given a uniformly random question x ∈ {0,1}k , the
probability of the quantum algorithm correctly predicts f (x) is
Pr
x∈{0,1}k
[hx = f (x)] ≤ 12 +
√
k · q
2k
, (3)
where hx is the output of the algorithm given the question x.
Proof. Let us denote γ(k) =
√
k·q
2k
. On input some index x, we view hx as the output of a “hy-
pothesis function” h : {0,1}k → {0,1}, such that hx = h(x). By contradiction, let us assume that the
hypothesis function h satisfies
Pr
x∈{0,1}k
[f (x) = h(x)] >
1
2
+
γ(k)
2
, (4)
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where x is drawn uniformly from {0,1}k . In this case, the mutual information between the truth
table of f , which we denote as z, and the truth-table of the hypothesis h is given by
I(z : h) =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
I(zx : h) =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
(H(zx)−H(zx|h)) = 2k −
∑
x∈{0,1}k
H(zx |h), (5)
where the first and last equality used the independence of the zxs because the truth table of f ,
i.e., z ∈ {0,1}2k , is a uniformly random string. By Fano’s inequality (in Lemma 2.2), it follows that
H(zx |h) ≤ Hb(px), where Hb(·) is the binary entropy function and px is the probability of error on
guessing zx by an arbitrary estimator whose input is h : {0,1}k → {0,1}. By assumption of h in
Equation (4), it follows that 1
2k
∑
x px <
1
2 − γ(k)2 . Using this, we then have that∑
x
H(zx|h) ≤max{px}
∑
x
Hb(px),
where the maximization is over {px} in the set
{
px :
1
2k
∑
x px ≤ 12 − γ(k)2
}
. Since Hb is a concave func-
tion, the maximum is obtained when all the pxs are equal (this also follows from Jensen’s in-
equality). Given our upper-bound on the sum
∑
x px, it follows that
∑
xHb(px) is maximized when
px =
1
2 − γ(k)2 for every x. In this case, we have
max
{px}
∑
x
Hb(px) ≤
∑
x
Hb
(
1
2
− γ(k)
2
)
= 2k ·Hb
(
1
2
− γ(k)
2
)
≤ 2k
(
1− 2γ(k)
2
ln2
)
, (6)
where we use Fact 2.1 in the last inequality. Putting together Equation (5) and (6), we obtain
I(z : h) >
2k+1γ(k)2
ln2
> 2 · k · q. (7)
We now upper bound the mutual information between the output hypothesis h and the uni-
formly random string z. One way to view the quantum algorithm is as a protocol where a quantum
membership query to z is a message from the algorithm to an oracle hiding z and the oracle’s out-
put is a message from the oracle to the algorithm. In this case, using Corollary 2.3 the mutual
information between the output hypothesis h and the random string z can be upper-bounded by
the communication complexity of the protocol,
I(h : z) ≤ (k +1) · q. (8)
However, since k ≥ 2, the lower bound in Equation (7) contradicts Equation (8), which in turn
contradicts our assumption in Equation (4). 
Now, we can prove the main technical result of this section.
Theorem 4.2 Let n,D ≥ 2 and k = D · logn. Let F = {fK : {0,1}k → {0,1} | K ∈ {0,1}n} be a family
of functions. Suppose there exists a t(n)-time uniform quantum-PAC learner for F (given access to q
quantum membership queries and uniform quantum examples) with bias β(n) ≥ 2
√
k·q
nD
Then there exists an O(t(n))-time quantum algorithm D that satisfies:∣∣∣∣ Pr
f ∼F
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]− Pr
f ∼U
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ β(n)
2
, (9)
where the probability is taken uniformly over f ∈ F and f ∈ U , where U is the set of all functions from
{0,1}k to {0,1}.
Proof. LetA be a t(n)-time uniform quantum-PAC learner that makes at most q quantum queries
to a concept c ∈ C and outputs a hypothesis h : {0,1}k → {0,1} such that
Pr
x∈{0,1}k
[c(x) = h(x)] ≥ 1
2
+ β(n),
where the probability is over x drawn uniformly from {0,1}k . Note that A can obtain a uniform
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quantum example by making a single quantum membership query, so without loss of generality
we assume A makes membership queries.
The goal is to use A to construct a quantum distinguisherD for the PRF F that satisfies Equa-
tion (9). Let the distinguisher D have quantum oracle access to the function f : {0,1}k → {0,1}.
The goal for D is to decide if f is a uniformly random function or if f ∈ F . In order to do this,
D proceeds by first running the quantum learning algorithm A as follows: whenever A makes a
quantum membership query, D uses its oracle to answer A.
After making q membership queries, A then outputs a hypothesis h. The distinguisher D
outputs 1 (i.e., f is a pseudo-random function) if and only if h(x) = f (x) for a uniformly random
x ∈ {0,1}k .
The running time of D is O(t(n)) since A runs in time t(n), each query has constant cost and
computing h(x) takes at most O(t(n)) time. We now show that D satisfies Equation (9). Suppose f
is a pseudo-random function i.e., f ∈ F . Each query from A will be answered correctly as D has
oracle access to it. Hence, we have
Pr[D|f 〉(·) = 1] = Pr
x∈{0,1}k
[f (x) = h(x)] ≥ 1
2
+ β(n), (10)
where the inequality follows from the correctness of the quantum learning algorithm A.
On the other hand, if f was a uniformly random function, using Lemma 4.1, we can con-
clude that
Pr[D|f 〉(·) = 1] = Pr
x∈{0,1}k
[f (x) = h(x)] ≤ 1
2
+
√
k · q
2k
=
1
2
+
√
k · q
nD
where the last equality uses the definition of k =D · logn.
Combining these two cases, the bias of the distinguisher D is
∣∣∣∣ Pr
f ∈F
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]− Pr
f ∈U
[D|f 〉(·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ (1
2
+ β(n)
)
−
(
1
2
+
√
k · q
nD
)
= β(n)−
√
k · q
nD
≥ β(n)
2
,
where the last inequality uses the definition of β(n). This concludes the proof. 
Our hardness results for TC0 and AC0 are based of the following corollary. In order for nota-
tional simplicity in the subsequent sections, we replace n in Theorem 4.2 byM below.
Corollary 4.3 Let M ≥ 2, D ∈ {2, . . . ,M/(4 logM)} and a > 0 be a constant. Let F = {fK : {0,1}k →
{0,1} | K ∈ {0,1}M} be a family of functions for some k =D · logM .
For any t(M) ≤MD−a and β(M) ≥ 2
√
k
Ma , if there exists a t(M)-time uniform quantum-PAC learner
for F with quantum membership queries and bias β(M), then there exists a distinguisher that runs in
time O(t(M)) and is able to distinguish F from a uniform random function.
Proof. First observe that the number of queries made by the learner is at most q ≤MD−a. Hence,
β(M) ≥ 2
√
k
Ma
= 2
√
kMD−a
MD
≥ 2
√
k · q
MD
,
which satisfies the assumption of Theorem 4.2. Hence, there is a O(t(M))-time quantum distin-
guisher for the PRF family F with distinguishing probability β(M) = 1/ poly(M) since we let a > 0
be a constant. 
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4.1 Hardness of learning TC0
For completeness, we formally state Result 3 and follow with its proof.
Theorem 4.4 Let n ∈N, q = 2O(nc) for some constant c ∈ (0,1), r ≤ poly(n) and t(n) ≤ 2O(polylog(n)). Let
Υ(r) be the n-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution over a degree-n cyclotomic ring with standard
deviation at most r in each coefficient. Assuming that the RLWEn,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for an O(t(n))-
time quantum computer, then there is noO(t(n))-time uniform weak quantum-PAC learner for poly(n)-
sized TC0 circuits.
Proof. We proceed by a proof of contradiction. First, consider the concept class to be the
1B−RPRFn,q,p,k function family RF as given by Definition 3.13, where 2 ≤ p≪ q are powers of 2,
k = logα n = ω(logn) for some constant α > 2, p = 2 and q = 2γ ·
k
k+1 and γ = nc for 0 < c < 1. Us-
ing Lemma 3.16 for d = n, every function in RF can be computed by an O(poly(n),ω(logn)) =
O(poly(n))-sized TC0 circuit. In other words, the concept class RF ⊆ TC0.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there is a t(n)-time uniform weak quantum learning
algorithm forRF , i.e., there exists a learner A forRF that uses at most t(n) queries/samples and
achieves bias β(n) = n−δ for some constant δ > 0.
Let M = (k + 1)logq = γk = γ logα n (where the first equality used that logq = γ · k/(k + 1) by
definition) and D = klogM =
logα n
logγ+α loglogn . Let a be some constant satisfying a ≥ 2(δ + 1)/c. This
choice of a allows us to show that
β(n) ≥ 1
nδ
≥ 1
nca/2−1
≥ 2
√
(logn)α(1−a)
nca
= 2
√
(logn)α(1−a)
γa
= 2
√
logα n
(γ logα n)a
= 2
√
k
Ma
,
where the last equality uses the definition of M and the penultimate equality uses the definition
of γ . Finally, notice that
D − a = log
α n
logγ +α loglogn
− a = log
α n
c logn+α loglogn
− a ≥ log
α−1n
2c
,
using γ = nc in the second equality. Therefore we have
MD−a ≥ (γ logα n) log
α−1 n
2c = 2O(polylog(n)) ≥ t(n).
This choice of parameters allows us to use Corollary 4.3, which implies the existence of anO(t(n))-
time distinguisher for the 1B−RPRFn,q,p,k familyRF . For the aforementioned choices of n,q and r,
using Lemma 3.15, we can translate the algorithm for RF to an O(t(n))-time quantum distin-
guisher for the RLWEn,q,Υ problem, which contradicts our assumption. 
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4.4 using Assumptions 1 and 2 gives us our main results:
Corollary 4.5 Let n ∈N, q = 2O(nc) for some constant 0 < c < 1, r ≤ poly(n) and Υ(r) be discrete Gaus-
sian distribution over degree-n cyclotomic rings with standard deviation at most r in each coefficient.
1. Assuming that the RLWEn,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for a poly(n)-time quantum computer, then there
is no poly(n)-time uniform weak quantum-PAC learner for poly(n)-sized TC0 circuits.
2. Assuming that the RLWEn,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for a 2
O(polylog(n))-time quantum computer, then
there is no 2O(polylog(n))-time uniform weak quantum-PAC learner for poly(n)-sized TC0 circuits.
4.2 Hardness of learning AC0
The proof for the hardness of learning AC0 is similar to the proof in the previous section and
will proceed by showing that for a suitable choice of parameters, the concept class constructed
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from RF can be evaluated by AC0 circuits. Recall from Lemma 3.17, that the circuit size scales
sub-exponentially with respect to the dimension of the underlying problem. Hence, in order
to prove the AC0 hardness, we make two changes. We first consider “smaller instances” of the
1B−RPRF that can now be computed in AC0 (instead of TC0 as we showed in Lemma 3.16). Sec-
ondly, we “weaken” the statement of our hardness result by showing that, the existence of a
quasi-polynomial time strong quantum learner for AC0 implies the existence of a strongly sub-
exponential time quantum distinguisher for RLWE (instead of polynomial-time quantum distin-
guishers for RLWE as we showed in Theorem 4.4).
We first give reasons as to why the strongly sub-exponential time assumption is justified. The
best known algorithms for d-dimensional LWE using various methods from lattice reduction tech-
niques [LLL82, CN11], combinatorial techniques [BKW03, Wag02] or algebraic ones [AG11] all
require 2O(d)-time in the asymptotic case. Even by quantizing any techniques, the improvements
so far only affect the constants in the exponent and do not provide general sub-exponential time
algorithms for LWE. It is also believed that the best-known algorithms for Ring-LWE do not do
much better than the lattice reduction/combinatorial methods used for LWE. While the exponen-
tial run-times correspond to the hardest instances of these problems, for the choice of parameters
used in this section, the algorithms scale more like 2Ω(
√
d). Hence, we are justified in weakening
our statement of hardness to the assumption that RLWE does not have 2d
1/η
-time algorithms for
every constant η > 2.
Before going into the proof, we provide some intuition as to why the choice of parameters
as defined in Lemma 3.17 forces us to impose stronger hardness assumptions – the circuits are
poly(n)-sized and the algorithms run in poly(n)-time but, the family RF is defined on a ring of
smaller dimension i.e., d = O(polylogn). However, from the perspective of the input size which
scales as poly(d), this means that the algorithms scale sub-exponentially in d. Hence, we need to
use the more stringent “no strongly sub-exponential time algorithms for RLWE” assumption. We
formally restate Result 5 below and proceed with its proof.
Theorem 4.6 Let c > η > 2 such that c/η > 2, and a ≥ 2 be constants. Let n ∈N, d = logc n, k = d1/η ,
q = dO(k) and r ≤ dλ for 0 < λ < 1/2 − O(1/k), Υ(r) be discrete Gaussian distribution over degree-
n cyclotomic rings with standard deviation at most r in each coefficient. Let t(d) ≤ 2d1/η and β(n) ≥
2(logn)c(1−2a)/2η . Assuming that RLWEd,q,Υ(r) is hard for a t(d)-time quantum computer, there is no
2(logn)
c/η
-time uniform quantum-PAC learner with bias β(n) for poly(n)-sized AC0 circuits.
Proof. Consider the constants c,η,ε such that c > η > 2 and ε ≤ ηη+c . Consider the concept class
RF from the function family 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k as given by Definition 3.13 where dimension d =
logc n, input k = d
1
η , andmoduli 2 < p≪ q are powers of 2 such that logq = k2 logdk+1 . By Lemma 3.17,
every function inRF can be computed by a 2O(d1/c)-sized AC0 circuit of depthO(1/ε) which isO(1)
since ε ≤ η/(η + c) ≤ 1. In other words, the AC0 circuits are of size 2O((logn)c·1/c) =O(poly(n)).
We now consider a function classRF against which we are going to prove our hardness result:
keeping Lemma 3.17 in mind, recall that the length of the key (i.e., number of bits to define the
parameters a,si ∈ Rq of the function fa,s1,...,sk ) is at mostM := (k +1)logq = d2/η logd, let
RF = {fK : {0,1}k → {0,1} | K ∈ {0,1}(k+1)logq}.
In order to discuss the hardness of learning the function classRF in terms of the hardness of d-
dimensional RLWE, we now relabel the function class above as follows: since (k +1)logq = k2 logd
and k = d1/η , we have:
RF = {fK : {0,1}k → {0,1} | K ∈ {0,1}d
2/η logd }.
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By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a t(d) ≤ 2d1/η = 2(logn)c/η -time uniform quan-
tum learner, with bias β(n), for poly(n)-sized AC0 circuits i.e., there exists a learnerA forRF that
uses at most t(d) queries/samples and achieves bias β(n).
Let D =
√
M
logM . Observe that k =D · logM ,
β(n) ≥ 2(logn)c(1−2a)/2η = 2d 12η − aη = 2
√
d1/η
d2a/η
≥ 2
√
k
Ma
. (11)
Additionally, observe that
(D − a) logM =
( √
M
logM
− a
)
· logM ≥
√
M/2 ≥ d1/η (
√
logd)/2 ≥ d1/η
Hence, it follows that MD−a ≥ 2d1/η ≥ t(d). We are now ready to apply Corollary 4.3 since
M,k,a and D satisfy the required properties. It now follows from Corollary 4.3 that there ex-
ists an O(t(d)) time distinguisher for the 1B−RPRFd,q,p,k problem with distinguishing advantage
at least β(n)/2 ≥ O(1/ poly(d)), from Equation (11). For the aforementioned choices of d,q and
r, using Lemma 3.15, this distinguisher can be converted into an O(t(d)) time algorithm for the
RLWEd,q,Υ(r) problem with an O(1/ poly(d)) distinguishing advantage. This contradicts the as-
sumption that algorithms for RLWEd,q,Υ(r) require 2
Ω(d1/η )-time and concludes the proof. 
While the previous theorem lower bounds shows that there is no quasi-polynomial-time algo-
rithm to learn AC0 circuits with β(n) ≥ O(1/ polylogn), we can weaken our assumption to also
consider strong learners with bias β(n) ≥O(1) (say, β = 1/6). Setting β(n) = 1/6 in Theorem 4.6, we
would obtain a distinguisher for d-dimensional RLWE that runs in time 2O(d
1/c) with a distinguish-
ing advantage β(n) = 1/12 ≥ 1/poly(d) thereby contradicting the sub-exponential time hardness
of RLWE. Using Assumption 3, this leads to the following corollary which is the main result in this
section.
Corollary 4.7 Let c > η > 2, n ∈N, d = logc n, k = d1/η ,q = dO(k) and r ≤ dλ for 0 < λ < 1/2−O(1/k).
Let Υ(r) be the discrete Gaussian distribution over a degree-n cyclotomic ring with standard deviation
at most r in each coefficient. Assuming that the RLWEd,q,Υ(r) problem is hard for a 2
o(d1/η )-time quantum
computer, then for all ν ≤ c/η − 1 there exists no nO(logν n)-time strong uniform quantum-PAC learner
can learn poly(n)-sized AC0 circuits.
Notice that this matches the Ω(npolylogn) lower bound for classical learning AC0 as obtained by
Kharitonov [Kha93] under the assumption factoring is quasi-polynomial-hard. In particular, this
lower bound also matches the O(nlog
α n) sample and time complexity upper bound for learning
AC0 circuits as demonstrated by Linial, Mansour and Nisan [LMN93] for some universal constant
α > 1. Hence, we can conclude that uniform strong quantum-PAC learners cannot offer a signifi-
cant advantage for learning AC0 circuits.
Using PRFs based on RLWR and our proof technique, we believe that it may not be possible to
find a lower bounds for weak quantum learners for AC0 circuits. The reason is two-fold: (1) The
circuit size of the PRF family scales as sub-exponential in the dimension d while the key-length
scales as poly(d) = O(polylogn) for AC0 circuits and (2) this limits the bias β(n) to be bounded
from below by O(1/poly(d)) = O(1/ polylogn) while weak learners are expected to have a bias
β(n) ≥O(1/ poly(n)). We leave the question of whether a different choice of quantum-secure PRFs
with a more efficient circuit implementation could improve the lower bound open for future work.
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5 Quantum-secure encryption vs. quantum learning
In this section, we prove a theorem relating the security of quantum public-key cryptosystems
and the hardness of quantum learning the class of decryption functions in the cryptosystem.
Kearns and Valiant [KV94] showed the simple, yet powerful connection between learning and
public-key cryptography: consider a secure public-key cryptosystem and define a concept class C
as the set of all decryption functions (one for every public and private key). Assume that there
was an efficient PAC learner for C. Given a set of encryptions (which should be viewed as labeled
examples), supposing an efficient learner for C was able to learn an unknown decryption function
with non-negligible advantage, then this learner would break the cryptosystem. This contradicts
the assumption that the cryptosystem was secure and, in turn, shows the infeasibility of learning
C. Kearns and Valiant used this connection to give hardness results for learning polynomial-
sized formulas, deterministic finite automata, and constant-depth threshold circuits based on the
assumption that Blum integers are hard to factor or that it is hard to invert the RSA function. Our
main contribution in this section is to quantize the theorem by Kearns and Valiant [KV94] and
draw a relation between quantum learning and security of quantum cryptosystems.
Theorem 5.1 Consider a public-key cryptosystem which encrypts bits by n-bit strings. Suppose that the
(randomized) encryption function is given by eKpub,r : {0,1} → {0,1}n (where K = (Kpub,Kpriv) consists
of the public and private keys and r is a random string) and the decryption function is given by dKpriv :{0,1}n → {0,1}. Let C = {dKpriv : {0,1}n → {0,1}}Kpriv be a concept class. Let
ε = Pr
K,r
[dKpriv(eKpub,r(0)) , 0 or dKpriv(eKpub,r(1)) , 1],
be the negligible probability of decryption error (where the probability is taken over uniformly random
K = (Kpub,Kpriv) and r). If there exists a weak quantum-PAC learner for C in time t(n) ≥ n that satisfies
t(n)β(n) = 1/nω(1), then there exists a t(n)-time quantum algorithm Adv that satisfies∣∣∣∣ Pr
K,r∗,b∗
[Adv(Kpub, eKpub,r∗(b
∗)) = b∗]− Pr
K,r∗,b∗
[Adv(Kpub, eKpub,r∗(b
∗)) = b∗]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1
poly(n)
, (12)
where the probability is taken over uniformly random K,r∗,b∗ over their respective domains.
Proof. For notational simplicity, for a fixed Kpub, let er,b := EncKpub,r(b) and E = {er,b : r,b} be the
set of all encryptions for the public key Kpub. Our goal here is to devise a quantum algorithm
Adv that satisfies the following: on input (Kpub, e
∗), where e∗ = er∗,b∗ is uniformly randomly chosen
from E , Adv outputs bˆ such that bˆ = b∗ with 1/poly(n) advantage over a random guess. Adv would
clearly serve as our quantum algorithm that satisfies Equation (12), thereby proving the theorem.
Our approach is to devise an Adv so that the remainder of our reasoning resembles the (clas-
sical) proof of this theorem by Klivans and Sherstov [KS09] (who in turn re-derived the proof of
Kearns and Valiant [KV94] in their paper). However the quantization of their proof is not straight-
forward. Classically, it is possible to generate samples from the uniform distribution supported
on E as follows: pick r and b uniformly at random from their respective domains and then out-
put the uniform classical examples (er,b,b). Quantumly, it is not clear how a polynomial-time
adversary Adv could create a quantum example
1√|E|
∑
r,b
|er,b〉|b〉. (13)
Notice that if an adversary could prepare the state in Equation (13), then it could directly pass t(n)
quantum examples to the quantum-PAC learner (assumed in the theorem statement) and a similar
analysis as in [KS09] gives a quantum algorithm (or distinguisher) that satisfies Equation (12).
However, one issue while preparing the state in Equation (13) is the following: the straightforward
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way to prepare the state Equation (13) would be create the uniform superposition 1√|E| |r〉|b〉|0〉 and
then in superposition prepare 1√|E| |r〉|b〉|er,b〉. If there was a way to erase the first register, then
we would get the state in Equation (13). However, erasing this register in a black-box way is
equivalent to solving the index-erasure problem [AMRR11, LR19], which needs exponential time.
In order to circumvent the issue mentioned above, we now show how to tweak the proof and
construct an adversary Advreal that correctly decrypt a challenge encryption (i.e., er∗,b∗ ) with non-
negligible probability. Before constructing Advreal, we first present an adversary Advideal that
is able to create specific samples (see Equation (14)) that Advreal could not create and analyze its
success probability. Then we show that the success probability of Advreal and Advideal in predicting
the challenge encryption (i.e., er∗,b∗ ) are very close.
Let Sideal = {(ri ,bi)i} be a fixed set of size L = 2nct(n) that contains (r∗,b∗) and let us assume
Advideal has access to Sideal. Then Advideal can create the quantum example
|ψideal〉 = 1√
L
∑
(r,b)∈Sideal
|er,b,b〉 (14)
in polynomial time. Notice that since Advreal does not know the decryption of er∗,b∗ , so it would
most likely not be able to obtain such an Sideal and consequently would not be able to create |ψideal〉
efficiently. We now continue our analysis for Advideal assuming it has access to quantum examples
|ψideal〉. Advideal first passes t(n) copies of |ψideal〉 to the quantum-PAC learning algorithm for C
(which is assumed by the theorem statement). Let H(D) be the distribution of the hypothesis
output by the quantum-PAC learning algorithm when the samples come from the distribution D.
For a set S = {(ri ,bi)}i , let DS be the uniform distribution on the training set {(er,b,b) : (r,b) ∈ S}.
Suppose the PAC learning algorithm outputs a hypothesis h ∈ supp(H(DS )), then Aideal outputs
h(er∗,b∗) as its guess for b
∗. We now analyze the probability that output of Advideal is in fact the
correct decryption of e∗:
Pr
e∗∈UE
[Advideal(e
∗) = b∗] = Pr
e∗∈UE
ES⊆E
[
Advideal(e
∗) = b∗
∣∣∣∣e∗ ∈ S ∧ |S | = L]
= Pr
e∗∈UE
ES⊆E
[
Pr
h∼H(DS )
[h(e∗) = b∗]
∣∣∣∣e∗ ∈ S ∧ |S | = L]
= Pr
e∗∈UE
∑
S⊆E
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S |e∗ ∈ S ∧ |S | = L] Pr
h∼H(DS )
[h(e∗) = b∗]
=
∑
S⊆E
∑
e∗∈S
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S ||S | = L] Pr
W∈US
[W = e∗] Pr
h∼H(DS )
[h(e∗) = b∗]
=
∑
S⊆E
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S ||S | = L] Pr
h∼H(DS )
[
Ee∗∈S [h(e∗) = b∗]
]
≥
∑
S⊆E
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S ||S | = L]
(
1
2
+
1
nc
)
=
1
2
+
1
nc
.
(15)
In the first equality, the expectation is taken over uniformly random S ⊆ E conditioned on |S | = L
and e∗ ∈ S , second equality describes the operations of Advideal, the fourth equality holds because
Pr
e∗∈UE
∑
S⊆E
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S |e∗ ∈ S ∧ |S | = L] = 1|E|
(
E − 1
L− 1
)−1
=
(
E
L
)−1
1
L
=
∑
S⊆E
∑
e∗∈S
Pr
S⊆E
[S = S ||S | = L] Pr
W∈US
[W = e∗]
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and the inequality comes from the guarantees of the quantum learning algorithm.17 Hence Equa-
tion (15) shows that the ideal quantum algorithm Advideal satisfies the following: on input a uni-
formly random e∗ = er∗,b∗ from the set E, Advideal outputs b∗ with probability at least 1/2+ n−c.
We now consider Advreal. Let
|ψreal〉 = 1√
L− 1
∑
(r,b)∈Sreal
|er,b,b〉, (16)
where Sreal = Sideal\{e∗}. The idea is that for L = 2nct(n), the distance between the two states |ψideal〉
and |ψreal〉 is small. Also notice that the state in Equation (16) can be constructed efficiently by
Advreal: pick L − 1 many (ri ,bi )-pairs uniformly at random from their respective domains and
set Sreal = {(ri ,bi )i}. From these classical values, the learner can create t(n) many copies of the
state |ψreal〉. We now show that a hypothesis sampled from H(DSreal) behaves “almost similar” to a
hypothesis sampled fromH(DSideal). For every y ∈ {0,1}n and b ∈ {0,1}, observe that
Pr
h∼H(DSreal )
[h(y) = b] = Pr
h∼H(DSreal )
[h(y) = b]− Pr
h∼H(DSideal )
[h(y) = b] + Pr
h∼H(DSideal )
[h(y) = b]
≥ Pr
h∼H(DSideal )
[h(y) = b]−O
(
t(n)
L
)
.
(17)
The inequality holds since the statistical distance of the output of an algorithm A in inputs |φ〉
and |φ′〉 is upper-bounded by ‖ |φ〉 − |φ′〉 ‖2, and we have that
‖ |ψideal〉⊗t(n) − |ψreal〉⊗t(n) ‖2 = t(n)‖ |ψideal〉 − |ψreal〉 ‖2 =O
(
t(n)
L
)
(18)
by the definition of |ψideal〉 and |ψreal〉 in Equation (14) and 16 respectively. We now analyze the
probability that Advreal outputs the right decryption b
∗, when given a uniformly random sample
e∗ ∈ E:
Pr
e∗∈UE
[Advreal(e
∗) = b∗] = Pr
e∗∈UE
ESreal⊆E
[
Advreal(e
∗) = b∗
∣∣∣∣|Sreal| = L− 1]
= Pr
e∗∈UE
ESreal⊆E
 Pr
h∼H(DSreal )
[h(e∗) = b∗]
∣∣∣∣|Sreal| = L = 1
≥ Pr
e∗∈UE
ESreal⊆E
 Pr
h∼H(DSideal )
[h(e∗) = b∗]
∣∣∣∣|Sreal| = L− 1−O ( t(n)L
)
≥ 1
2
+
1
nc
−O
(
t(n)
L
)
≥ 1
2
−O
(
1
nc
)
.
(19)
In the equations above, recall that Sideal = Sreal∪{(e∗,b∗)}, the first inequality used Equation (17),
the second inequality used the same analysis as in Equation (15) and the last inequality used
L = 2nct(n). This shows that Advreal, on input a uniformly random e
∗ = EncKpub,r∗(b
∗) from the set
E , outputs b∗ with probability at least 1/2+O(n−c).
It remains to show that Adv satisfies Equation (12), which is equivalent to
|2 Pr
K,r∗,b∗
[Adv(Kpub, eKpub ,r∗(b
∗)) = b∗]− 1|. (20)
Letting Adv be Advreal in the calculation above, we have
|2 Pr
K,r∗,b∗
[Adv(Kpub, eKpub,r∗(b
∗)) = b∗]− 1| ≥O
(
1
nc
)
=
1
poly(n)
,
17Note that we have assumed for simplicity that (i) dKpriv(eKpub ,r (b)) = b with probability 1 and (ii) the quantum
learning algorithm outputs a hypothesis with probability 1. If we take into account the decryption probability error
ε(n) and that the learning algorithm succeeded with probability 1− δ, then the lower bound in Equation (15) would be
1
2 + (1− δ)n−c − ε(n) and the remaining part of the analysis remains the same.
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where the inequality used Equation (19). This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
5.1 Hardness of learning TC02
We show here a conditional hardness of quantum learning depth-2 threshold circuits.
Theorem 5.2 Let n ∈ N. Assuming that the n-dimensional LWE problem is hard for a poly(n)-time
quantum computer, there is no poly(n)-time weak quantum-PAC learner for the concept class of TC02
circuits on O˜(n)-bit inputs.
The main point of difference between the proof of Theorem 5.2 and the (classical) result of
Klivans and Sherstov [KS09] is in the connection between quantum learning and public-key quan-
tum cryptosystems which we already discussed in the previous section. The remaining part of our
proof follows their structure very closely. For brevity, we state a simple lemma from their paper
without a proof.
Lemma 5.3 [KS09, Lemma 4.1] Fix ε > 0 to be a constant. Assume that the intersection of nε light
half-spaces is weakly quantum-PAC-learnable. Then for every constant c > 0, the intersection of nc light
degree-2 PTFs are weakly quantum-PAC learnable.18
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. In order to prove the hardness of TC02, we first consider a subclass of
TC02, intersection of polynomially-many half-spaces, and prove the conditional quantum hardness
of learning this subclass.
Fix ε > 0 to be a constant. Let C be the concept class of nε light half-spaces and C′ be the
concept class of degree-2 light PTFs. Let us assume that C is quantum-PAC learnable. Then
by Lemma 5.3, the assumed learnability of C implies the quantum-PAC learnability of C′. By
Lemma 3.7, the decryption function of the LWE-cryptosystem is in C′. Using Theorem 5.1, we
now relate the quantum-PAC learnability of C′ to the LWE-cryptosystem as follows: suppose that
there exists a quantum-PAC learning algorithm for C′ , then Theorem 5.1 implies the existence
of a distinguisher that can differentiate the encryptions of 0 and 1 in the LWE-cryptosystem. As
a consequence, by Theorem 3.6 this would result in a quantum polynomial-time distinguisher
for LWE. Using Claim 2.5, we have that C ⊆ TC02. Putting this together with our observation in the
previous paragraph about quantum PAC learnability of C, we get the theorem statement. 
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A Time-efficient learning of NC0
We prove the following theorem, which is straightforward from known results in quantum learn-
ing theory. Since we didn’t find an explicit reference to the proof of such an explicit theorem in
literature, we make it formal here.
Theorem A.1 Let c > 0 be a constant. Let C be the concept class of all Boolean functions on n bits which
are computable by polynomial number of gates with at most 2 inputs and depth at most d. Then C can be
learned under the uniform distribution with error at most ε, using at most O˜(2d /ε) quantum examples,
O(22
d
) classical examples and time O˜(n2d/ε +22
d
log(1/ε)).
The proof directly follows from Atıcı and Servedio’s theorem on learning k-juntas.
Theorem A.2 ([AS09]) There exists a quantum algorithm for learning k-juntas under the uniform
distribution that uses O((k logk)/ε) uniform quantum examples, O(2k) uniform classical examples, and
O˜(nk/ε +2k log(1/ε)) time.
Now we proceed with proving our theorem.
Proof of Theorem A.1. Suppose that f : {0,1}n → {0,1} is computed by a circuit with depth at
most d. Since the gates of the circuit have fan-in at most 2, clearly the output of the circuit for
f (on an arbitrary input x) depends only on 2d bits of x. Hence every f ∈ C is a 2d-junta. Using
Theorem A.2, it follows that the concept class of 2d-juntas can be learned using O˜(2d /ε) quantum
examples, O(22
d
) classical examples and time O˜(n2d/ε +22
d
log(1/ε)). 
Corollary A.3 Let c > 0 be a constant. Let C be the concept class of n-bit functions which are computable
by polynomial number of gates with fan-in at most 2, depth at most log(c logn). Then C can be learned
using at most O˜(n/ε) quantum examples, O(nc) classical examples and time O˜(nc/ε).
Proof. The proof immediately follows from Theorem A.1 by plugging in d = log(c logn). 
Observe that, since NC0 is the class of circuits on n-bits with depth O(1), NC0 is contained in
the concept class C considered in the corollary above.
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